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The Trump administration has undertaken a sweeping portfolio of actions aimed at 
weakening federal climate protections and promoting the development and use of fossil fuels, 
primarily in support of President Trump’s “energy dominance” agenda, and consistent with his 
views that humans are not causing serious climate change and that environmental regulations 
confer many costs and few benefits. Acting pursuant to the President’s orders, federal agencies 
have initiated the process of reviewing and potentially revising or rescinding all of the major 
regulations enacted by the Obama administration to curtail greenhouse gas emissions from 
stationary and mobile sources. The administration has also sought to withdraw the U.S. from the 
Paris Agreement, expand and expedite fossil fuel development on federal lands and waters, delay 
and withdraw energy efficiency standards, and bail out the failing coal industry.  
From the outside, it appears that the administration is flexing its powers to implement 
President Trump’s agenda.  But the power of the executive branch is not absolute, and the 
administration can only go so far before courts, legislators, or other factors outside of its control 
prevent it from achieving its goals.  In fact, the administration has achieved far less progress in 
implementing its deregulatory agenda than many assume. 
This paper takes a critical look at what the Trump administration has actually 
accomplished in terms of repealing and modifying greenhouse gas emission standards and 
otherwise advancing its pro-fossil fuel agenda. As detailed herein and summarized in Figures 1 
and 2, the scope of the efforts taken pursuant to this agenda is extremely broad – there are dozens 
of different deregulatory actions underway at various agencies, most notably the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). But in most cases, the pace of these efforts has been quite slow. This is 
particularly true for efforts to repeal or revise major regulations like the Clean Power Plan and 
the motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission and fuel economy standards, as the administration 
must adhere to notice-and-comment procedures and must also justify any changes to these rules 
in light of the statutory provisions it is implementing.  
The administration has been able to quickly rescind and replace internal policy documents 
that are not subject to the same procedural requirements as formal regulations, but the practical 
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effect of these internal policy changes remains unclear. In many instances, President Trump’s 
policies are directly at odds with statutory mandates and therefore unlikely to have a significant 
or enduring effect on agency practices. The many deregulatory processes that have been initiated 
are also consuming a large amount of federal government resources and creating significant 
uncertainty for regulated industries – consequences which are direct conflict with the President’s 
stated goals of reducing regulatory inefficiencies and supporting regulated industries such as the 
power sector.  
Ultimately, the Trump administration will face many barriers in actually effectuating its 
goals of lifting regulatory burdens and achieving “energy dominance” through greater reliance 
on fossil fuels.  Courts have already shot down many of the administration’s initial efforts to 
undermine existing regulations, and there is a reasonable chance that some of the final rules to 
repeal or replace those regulations will also be vacated by the courts.  Even if the administration 
is successful in repealing critical climate regulations, the real-world effect of these repeals may be 
limited by external legal, social, and economic drivers.  A future administration could also reverse 
course and reinstate regulation.   
Meanwhile, many state and local governments and private actors are moving forward 
with their own actions to address climate change.  This situation is deeply problematic for 
regulated entities that need policy coherence and predictability.  Companies typically prefer 
uniform federal standards to the complicated and conflicting state and local laws that are 
emerging in the absence of clear federal regulations.   
The deregulatory strategies deployed by President Trump and federal agencies can be 
summarized as follows: 
White House: President Trump has rescinded almost all of the executive orders and 
policy documents issued by the Obama administration to provide guidance to federal agencies 
on climate change mitigation, energy efficiency, and sustainability. President Trump has also 
issued executive orders aimed at supporting fossil fuel development or use (without serious 
efforts to find ways to use them relatively cleanly, such as through carbon capture, use and 
sequestration).  This effort has included orders directing agencies to take swift action to review 
and repeal or replace any regulations, guidance documents, and internal policies that could 
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burden the development or use of domestically-produced fossil fuels. This effectively 
encompasses all actions taken to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels, otherwise 
control the externalities of fossil fuels, and reduce energy consumption. As part of his broader 
deregulation agenda, President Trump has also issued several orders that are aimed at 
encouraging regulatory repeals and preventing the issuance of new regulations.   
Environmental Protection Agency: EPA has initiated notice-and-comment rulemakings 
to review and revise or rescind the regulations issued by the Obama administration to control 
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary and mobile sources. This is a lengthy multi-year 
process, as the agency must issue a proposal to replace or repeal the original rule, accept public 
comment on that proposal, consider the comments, and then issue a final rule. EPA is moving 
most vigorously with its plans to repeal and replace the Clean Power Plan (establishing emission 
standards for existing power plants), the greenhouse gas emission standards for light-duty 
vehicles, and the methane emission standards for new sources in the oil and gas sector; it has 
already issued proposals to repeal or significantly revise each of these rules. Once EPA issues 
final rules to repeal or replace these standards, they will almost certainly be challenged in court 
and subjected to judicial scrutiny to determine whether they comport with the requirements of 
the Clean Air Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and other statutes. In the meantime, EPA 
has sought to delay the effective date of certain rules during its review process, but courts have 
struck down most of these attempts. As a result, many of the rules that are under review remain 
in place today. 
EPA has also acted to roll back other rules aimed at controlling the externalities of fossil 
fuel-fired combustion, either through notice-and-comment proceedings to modify those rules, or 
by simply failing to implement and enforce those rules. The enforcement failures have already 
been challenged in court, and any formal modifications to the rules will likely be the subject of 
litigation as well. 
Department of Interior (DOI): DOI has taken several actions to remove barriers to fossil 
fuel development, including: the issuance of a final rule repealing key provisions of the Methane 
Waste Prevention Rule (which established methane emission standards for oil and gas sources 
on federal lands);  terminating the moratorium on and programmatic review of the federal coal 
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leasing program;  revising its operating procedures to streamline fossil fuel permitting; curtailing 
environmental reviews of fossil fuel-related proposals; and removing protections for endangered 
species. DOI has also expanded the public lands and waters available for fossil fuel development, 
in part by working with the President to remove protections for national monuments. Multiple 
lawsuits have been filed challenging these actions as well.  
Department of Energy (DOE): DOE has delayed and withdrawn energy efficiency 
standards that were in development or finalized at the end of the Obama administration. Some 
of these delays were successfully challenged in court and DOE was compelled to finalize and 
enforce the standards. DOE has also sought to use its authority as an energy regulator to subsidize 
the failing coal industry but has run up against opposition from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) and would likely be sued if it adopts any final action to this effect. Finally, 
DOE and FERC have made efforts to expedite approvals of applications for natural gas 
transportation infrastructure and to curtail the scope of environmental reviews for those 
applications. 
State Department: The State Department has implemented President Trump’s orders to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement. However, due to the rules for withdrawing from that 
agreement, the State Department has only been able to issue notification of U.S. intent to 
withdraw when eligible to do so late in 2020, an action that a subsequent president could reverse 
at any time. The U.S.  remains a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the administration has made no effort to withdraw from that agreement. 
 
Figure ES-1 (next page) summarizes the status of deregulatory efforts with respect to 
formal regulations issued by the Obama administration and now under review by the Trump 
administration. Figure ES-2 (page vi) lists the legal challenges which have been filed in response 
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Methane NSPS for Oil 
and Gas Sources
In effect with minor 
amendments
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Municipal Landfills
CO2 NSPS for Power 
Plants
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Penalties
HFC Product Standards
PROGRESS TOWARDS REPEAL & REPLACEMENT
Cross-State Air 
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  most or entire rule affected   minor aspects of rule affected   no action 
X action vacated or stayed by court † action vacated or stayed by court * N+C = notice and comment
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RULE RELATED CASES* CASE STATUS
Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule
Delaware v. EPA, No. 17-1099 (3d. Cir. Mar. 23, 2017): Challenging 
EPA failure to respond to state petition seeking enforcement of rule.
Dismissed  (8-31-18).
Delaware v. EPA, No. 17-1099 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2017): Same. Open.
Connecticut v. Pruitt, No. 3:17-cv-00796 (D. Conn. May 16, 2017): 
Same.
Court ordered EPA to 
respond (2-7-18); EPA 
denied petition (4-13-18).
Maryland v. EPA, No. 1:17-cv-02873 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2017): Same. Court ordered EPA to 
respond (6-13-18); EPA 
denied petition (10-5-18).
New York et al. v. EPA, No. 18-406 (S .D.N.Y. Jan 17, 2018): Same. Court ordered EPA to 
respond (6-12-18).
New York et al. v. EPA, No. 19-1019 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019): 
Challenging EPA determination on adequacy of existing CSAPR rule.
Open.
Vehicle Standards - 
Penalties
NRDC v. NHTSA, No. 17-280 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2017): Challenging 
NHTSA's delay of rule establishing penalties for non-compliance with 
vehicle emission standards.
Court vacated rule which 
delayed effective date of 
penalties (4-23-18).
HFC Product Standards NRDC v. Wheeler, No. 18-1172 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2018): Challenging 
EPA decision to suspend enforcement of HFC rule.
Open.
New York v. Wheeler, No. 18-1174 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2018): Same. Open.
Methane Standards for 
Municipal Landfills
NRDC v. Pruitt, No. 17-1157 (D.C. Cir 2017): Challenging EPA's 
administrative stay of performance standards and emission guidelines for 
municipal solid waste landfills.
Petitioners agreed to 




New York et al. v. Perry, No. 17-918 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2017): 
Challenging DOE decision to delay energy efficiency standards for ceiling 
fans.
Resolved when DOE issued 
standards (5-24-17)
NRDC v. Perry, No. 4:17-cv-03404 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2017): 
Challenging DOE failure to issue final efficiency standards for air 
compressors, walk-in coolers/freezers, uninterruptable power supplies, 
portable A/C units, and commercial packaged boilers.
Court held DOE failure 
violated EPCA (2-15-18).
NRDC v. DOE, No. 1:170-cv-06989 (S .D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2017): 
Challenging temporary suspension of efficiency test procedures for air 
conditioners and heat pumps.
Court held suspension was 
unlawful (2-22-19).
N/A (no final action)
      * Does not include legal challenges to rules issued by Obama administration.
Continued on next page…
Mercury and Air 
Toxics Standard
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RULE RELATED CASES* CASE STATUS
Heavy-duty Vehicle 
Standards (gliders)
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No. 18-1190 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 
2018): Challenging EPA's "no action assurance" re: enforcement of heavy-
duty vehicle GHG emission / fuel economy standards for small 
manufacturers of glider kits and vehicles.
Court stayed "no action 
assurance" (7-18-18) and  
EPA revoked it (7-26-18).
N/A (no final action)
N/A (no final action)
Light-duty Vehicle 
Standards
California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2018): Challenging 
EPA's revocation and re-issuance of its final determination re: the 
appropriateness of light-duty vehicle emission standards MY 2022-2025.
Open.
Methane NSPS for Oil 
and Gas Sources
Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2017): 
Challenging EPA's administrative stay of methane NSPS.




California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-03804 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 5, 2017): 
Challenging BLM's administrative stay of the methane waste prevention 
rule.
Court vacated administrative 
stay (10-4-17).
California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-07186 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2017): 
Challenging BLM's "suspension rule" which delayed the effective date of 
methane waste prevention rule for 1 year.
Court issued preliminary 
injunction of rule (2-22-18); 
BLM appealed (4-32-18).
California v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-05712 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018): 
Challenging final amendments to rule.
Open.




California et al v. DOI et al, No. C17-5948 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2017): 
Challenging repeal of rule as arbitrary and capricious under APA.
      * Does not include legal challenges to rules issued by Obama administration.
Coal, Oil and Gas 
Valuation Rule
Court vacated repeal (3-29-
19).
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I. Introduction 
During his campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump made it clear that he believed 
climate change was a “hoax” and intended to use the power of the Executive Branch to dismantle 
the regulatory architecture established by the Obama administration to address climate change. 
The president argued that lifting unnecessary regulatory burdens, reviving the U.S. coal industry, 
and achieving American energy dominance would stimulate economic growth and create jobs 
for American workers. Since then, his administration has made considerable efforts to repeal or 
modify a wide array of regulations, policies, and guidance aimed at curtailing greenhouse gas 
emissions and otherwise controlling the use and externalities of fossil fuels. The Trump 
administration has also supplemented its deregulatory efforts with new policies and proposals 
aimed at further promoting and subsidizing the development and use of fossil fuels.  
The administration has been able to pursue such a sweeping deregulatory agenda, at least 
in part, because the regulatory framework to address climate change was put into place through 
executive action rather than congressional action. But the administration’s authority to modify 
this framework is nonetheless constrained by statutory mandates and other factors outside of its 
control. These constraints include the substantive mandates of statutes such as the Clean Air Act 
(which provided the original basis for many of the policies that President Trump now seeks to 
unravel) as well as procedural requirements that agencies must adhere to when modifying or 
repealing existing regulations.1 Due to these constraints, the process of deregulation has been a 
slow one, and will likely continue to move at a slow pace for the remainder of the Trump 
presidency.  Once rules and other actions are finalized, they will be subject to judicial review and 
may be annulled by the courts.2  
                                                 
1 For an in-depth overview of procedural requirements governing regulatory rollbacks, see Bethany A. Davis Noll & 
Denise A. Grab, Deregulation: Process and Procedures That Govern Agency Decisionmaking in an Era of Rollbacks, 38 
ENERGY L.J. 269 (2017). 
2 As detailed herein, many lawsuits have already been filed challenging the administration’s failure to implement and 
enforce existing rules, and several decisions have been issued holding that agencies abrogated their duties in this 
context. Lawsuits have also been filed challenging new policies issued by the Trump administration, but these 
lawsuits have been less successful due to the lack of a “final agency action” to challenge. More legal challenges will 
come once the administration does issue final actions with respect to specific regulations like the Clean Power Plan. 
For a more detailed discussion of litigation during the first year of the Trump administration, see Dena P. Adler, U.S. 
Climate Change Litigation in the Age of Trump: Year One (Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 2018). 
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Even if President Trump’s rollbacks are upheld in court, they could be reversed by a 
future president or Congress. In the meantime, his deregulatory agenda is prompting a 
proliferation of state and local actions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, including 
legal actions aimed at curbing fossil fuel development.  This is leading to a patchwork of state 
policies that is less than optimal for the goal of protecting the climate and that is potentially 
burdensome for many American companies. In sum, the administration is expending an 
enormous amount of resources on a deregulatory agenda that may accomplish very little other 
than delaying action on climate change and creating a huge amount of regulatory uncertainty for 
regulated entities. This is not a “small government” approach, nor does it serve the long-term 
interests of industries that need to start preparing for a transition to a low-carbon economic 
future. 
This paper assesses what the Trump administration has actually accomplished in terms 
of rolling back or amending emission standards, other regulations, and climate policies, taking 
into account administrative hurdles as well as judicial challenges faced by agencies.3  Part II 
describes some of the overarching policies issued by President Trump and the White House to 
guide deregulatory efforts. Part III describes the actions undertaken by EPA to roll back rules 
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and otherwise addressing externalities associated 
with fossil fuel use. Part IV describes the actions undertaken by the Department of Interior to 
remove barriers to fossil fuel development on public lands and waters. Part V describes the 
Department of Energy’s efforts to delay energy efficiency standards and support fossil fuel-fired 
utilities. Part VI describes the State Department’s role in the President’s intended withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement. Part VII concludes that the current situation is untenable for both 
regulated entities and the American public and that a cohesive federal policy, preferably enacted 
by Congress, would better serve all interests.4 
                                                 
3 This paper focuses on policies and regulations that deal with climate change mitigation – i.e., the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  It does not address the policies and regulations that deal with climate change adaptation.  
4 The Climate Leadership Council and others have advocated for congressional legislation to create a carbon tax and 
dividend program based on studies suggesting that this would have a greater emissions impact and be more efficient 
than the current framework of regulations. See David Bailey & Greg Bertelsen, A Winning Trade: How Replacing the 
Obama-Era Climate Regulations With a Carbon Dividends Program Starting at $40/Ton Would Yield Far Greater Emission 
Reductions (Climate Leadership Council 2018). See also Justin Gundlach, To Negotiate a Carbon Tax: A Rough Map of 
Interactions, Tradeoffs, and Risks, 43(S) COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 269 (2018). 
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II. Executive Policy Framework under the Trump Administration 
In the late-2000s, there was a strong push for federal action on climate change. More than 
a decade had passed since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) had entered into force, the nations of the world had recognized that climate change 
was one of the most pressing environmental problems of our time, and yet greenhouse gas 
emissions and fossil fuel use were still on the rise. Congress failed to enact a legislative solution 
to the problem, and so the Obama administration used its authority to enact a broad suite of 
policies and regulations to curtail greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel use. While some of 
President Obama’s policies were issued solely on the basis of his executive authority, the most 
significant actions – specifically, greenhouse gas emission standards for power plants, motor 
vehicles, and other source categories – were promulgated under the authority of the Clean Air 
Act and other federal statutes. These regulations are thus tethered to legal requirements that 
cannot be modified or repealed by executive fiat. 
Upon taking office, President Trump made it clear that he intended to reverse course and 
dismantle the regulatory architecture that his predecessor had put in place, consistent with his 
campaign promises. He published his “America First Energy Plan” in which he promised to 
exploit the country’s “vast untapped domestic energy reserves” and remove “burdensome 
regulations” including “harmful and unnecessary policies such as the Clean Power Plan.”5 He 
also promised to “reviv[e] America’s coal industry” and otherwise support and promote 
domestic fossil fuel development and use.6 
President Trump then issued a series of executive orders aimed at solidifying his 
deregulatory agenda. First came two overarching orders on deregulation: Executive Order 13771, 
“Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” instructed agencies to identify two 
existing regulations to be repealed for every one regulation that is proposed and to ensure that 
the incremental costs of new regulations finalized in the year are no greater than zero.7 Executive 
                                                 
5 Exec. Office of the President, An America First Energy Plan (2017), available at https://perma.cc/Z7UG-UGCC. 
6 Id. 
7 Exec. Order No. 13771 of January 30, 2017: Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 
3, 2017).  
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Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” directed agencies to designate 
Regulatory Reform Officers and establish Regulatory Reform Task Forces to evaluate and identify 
regulations for repeal.8 The legality of these orders is dubious, as they direct agencies to consider 
impermissible factors (i.e., factors not specified in statutes) when making regulatory decisions.9 
Plaintiffs have not yet been able to establish a concrete “injury” which would give rise to standing 
to bring a lawsuit challenging the executive orders, but that situation could  change as agencies 
take concrete action to implement these directives.10 
These broad deregulatory orders were followed by more specific orders pertaining to 
climate change and energy. Executive Order 13783, “Promoting Energy Independence and 
Economic Growth,” laid the foundation for the administration’s attack on climate change 
regulations. It directed agencies to review all actions that potentially “burden the development 
or use of domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, 
coal and nuclear energy resources,” and to rescind or revise any actions which do burden the 
development or use of those resources.11 It explicitly called for the review of all major greenhouse 
gas emissions standards, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s Clean Power 
Plan (which established carbon pollution guidelines for existing power plants), EPA’s carbon 
pollution standards for new power plants, EPA’s methane emission standards for oil and gas 
sources, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)’s methane waste rule. 
In addition, the order directly repealed certain presidential and regulatory actions 
pertaining to energy and climate, including President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, which was 
established with the goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, preparing the U.S. for the 
                                                 
8 Exec. Order No. 13777 of February 24, 2017: Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Mar. 1, 
2017).  
9 See Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Trump’s Executive Order on Regulatory Costs is Not Only Arbitrary; It is Also 
Against the Law, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017). 
10 See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to 
challenge the legality of the executive orders when they were first issued, but acknowledging that plaintiffs may be 
able to establish standing in the future). 
11 Exec. Order No. 13783 of March 28, 2017: Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 
16093 (Mar. 31, 2017). This order broadly defined “burden” as “unnecessarily obstruct, delay, curtail, or otherwise 
impose significant costs on the siting, permitting, production, utilization, transmission, or delivery of energy 
resources.” Id. at §2(b). 
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impacts of climate change, and leading international efforts to address climate change;12 various 
memoranda and reports that were issued by President Obama to further flesh out the actions his 
administration would take to address climate change;13 and the technical guidance establishing 
the social cost of carbon (SC-CO2), methane (SC-CH4), and nitrous oxide (SC-N2O) metrics to be 
used by federal agencies in regulatory actions.14  Notably, the order did not expressly prohibit 
agencies from using the SC-CO2, SC-CH4, and SC-N2O metrics – rather, it called for a review of 
those metrics and instructed agencies to “ensure… that any estimates [of the social cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions] are consistent with guidance contained in OMB Circular A-4” in the 
meantime.15  
President Trump’s order also contained directives to specific agencies to rescind guidance, 
policies, and other decisions pertaining to climate change.  In particular, it directed the Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to rescind its “Final Guidance for Federal Departments and 
Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in 
National Environmental Policy Act Reviews,”16 and it directed the Department of Interior (DOI) 
to terminate its programmatic environmental review of the federal coal leasing program as well 
as its moratorium on the issuance of new coal leases.17 Finally, the order directed all agencies to 
identify any additional actions related to or arising from the rescinded policies, memoranda, and 
                                                 
12 Exec. Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan (June 2013), available at https://perma.cc/7U9P-
7GVE. 
13 The revoked memoranda and reports included:  Presidential Memorandum of June 25, 2013: Power Sector Carbon 
Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39535 (July 1, 2013); Presidential Memorandum of November 3, 2015: Mitigating 
Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and Encouraging Related Private Investment, 80 Fed. Reg. 68747 
(Nov. 6, 2015), Presidential Memorandum of September 21, 2016: Climate Change and National Security; Exec. Office 
of the President, Climate Action Plan Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions (March 2014). 
14 Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document: Technical 
Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (May 2013, 
Revised August 2016); Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Addendum to Technical 
Support Document on Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866: 
Application of the Methodology to Estimate the Social Cost of Methane and the Social Cost of Nitrous Oxide (Aug. 
2016). 
15 Exec. Order No. 13783, supra note 11, § 5. 
16 CEQ, Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of 
Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews (Aug. 1, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/F7BR-E6WX. 
See also CEQ, Notice of Final Guidance, 81 Fed. Reg. 51866 (Aug. 5, 2016). 
17 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3338: Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to Modernize the 
Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/JVT4-J7VR. 
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orders issued by President Obama and to suspend, rescind, or revise those actions as soon as 
practicable. 
Since then, President Trump has issued additional orders further elaborating on his 
energy policy agenda. Executive Order 13795, “Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy 
Strategy,” called  upon DOI to establish procedures for expanding and streamlining offshore oil 
and gas development.18 Executive Order 13807, “Establishing Discipline and Accountability in 
the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects,” contained 
directives aimed at expediting the federal approval of major infrastructure projects (defined to 
include energy production and generation, electricity transmission, and pipeline projects).19 
Executive Order 13834, “Efficient Federal Operations,” established general goals on energy, water 
and resource efficiency, while simultaneously revoking an Obama-era order that required 
agencies to set specific energy efficiency and greenhouse gas reduction goals.20 Most recently, 
Executive Order 13868, “Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth”, and Executive 
Order 13867, “The Issuance of Permits with Respect to Facilities and Land Transportation 
Crossings at the International Boundaries of the United States”, both contained provisions aimed 
at removing barriers to and expediting federal approvals for energy infrastructure, particularly 
oil and gas pipelines.21 
The administration is also moving forward with efforts to change and potentially curtail 
the analysis of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change-related considerations in 
environmental reviews conducted under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In 2018, 
CEQ issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) in which it announced that it 
was considering updating the implementing regulations for NEPA to “ensure a more efficient, 
                                                 
18 Exec. Order No. 13795 of April 28, 2017, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 
(May 3, 2018).  
19 Exec. Order No. 13807 of August 15, 2017: Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental review 
and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects, 82 Fed. Reg. 40463 (Aug. 24, 2017). 
20 Exec. Order No. 13834 of May 17, 2018: Efficient Federal Operations, 83 Fed. Reg. 23771 (May 22, 2018) (revoking 
Exec. Order No. 13693 of March 19, 2015: Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade). 
21 Exec. Order No. 13868 of April 10, 2019: Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth (Apr. 10, 2019); 
Exec. Order No. 13867 of April 10, 2019: The Issuance of Permits with Respect to Facilities and Land Transportation 
Crossings at the International Boundaries of the United States (Apr. 10, 2019). 
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timely, and effective” review process.22 CEQ has also been quietly working on revised guidance 
on the consideration of greenhouse gas emissions in NEPA documentations – it submitted a draft 
of the guidance to OIRA on February 6, 2019,23 but it has not yet solicited any public input on the 
draft or published any information about the scope and content of the guidance. 
While some of the policy changes introduced by President Trump did take immediate 
effect, the directives with the most significant consequences – specifically, those to review and 
repeal or replace major climate regulations – can only be implemented by agencies in accordance 
with the notice-and-comment procedures established by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) and the substantive statutory mandates under which these regulations were initially 
promulgated. These laws provide an important constraint on the administration’s ability to move 
forward with its deregulatory agenda.  
Moreover, to the extent that the administration has enacted immediate changes in policy, 
these changes have not necessarily had the intended effect. The rescission of CEQ guidance on 
climate change and environmental reviews is a good example: that guidance did not impose any 
new requirements on agencies, it simply reflected pre-existing legal obligations outlined in 
NEPA, as fleshed out by the implementing regulations and judicial decisions. As such, the 
rescission of this guidance had no legal effect on the scope of agency obligations under NEPA 
and only a limited practical effect on how agencies conduct NEPA analysis.24   However, the 
rescission does add to uncertainty over how to treat greenhouse gas emissions in the NEPA 
process. 
The administration has also sought to scale back or wholly eliminate federal funding for 
programs involving climate change science, mitigation, and adaptation, with only limited 
success. For example, President Trump’s budget request for FY2018 proposed major cuts to EPA’s 
                                                 
22 CEQ, ANPR: Update to the Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 28591 (June 20, 2018). 
23 OIRA, Pending EO 12866 Regulatory Review: RIN: 0331-ZA03, EO 12866 Meetings, 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoDetails?rrid=128676 (last visited May 16, 2019). 
24 As discussed in Part IV, some agencies have attempted to curtail their analysis of greenhouse gas emissions in 
NEPA reviews so as to avoid reaching a determination that those emissions are a “significant impact” under NEPA. 
Nonetheless, agency reviews still comport with almost all of the recommendations contained in the guidance (e.g., 
agencies are accounting for direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions as well as the impacts of climate change on 
proposals undergoing NEPA review). And the rescission of the guidance appears to have had no effect on how 
courts interpret agency obligations under NEPA.  
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Clean Air and Climate programs, the earth science programs managed by the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and the clean energy research programs managed by the Department of 
Energy (DOE). Congress rejected most of these proposed cuts in the FY2018 spending package 
and actually increased funding for the DOE clean energy research programs.25 The administration 
has been more successful with its efforts to scale back international climate finance, as Congress 
did adopt the President’s FY2018 proposal to eliminate funding to the UNFCCC, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the Green Climate Fund (GCF).26 
However, Congress  rejected proposed cuts to other sources of international climate finance and 
allocated nearly $140 million in FY2018 to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which is one 
of financial mechanisms for the UNFCCC.27 
For these reasons, there is considerably less than meets the eye with respect to the 
administration’s progress towards rolling back the existing portfolio of rules and policies 
developed agencies to address climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Below, we 
describe the status of specific deregulatory efforts, focusing first on efforts at EPA and then 
turning to other agencies. 
III. Environmental Protection Agency 
A. Cross-cutting Policies and Proposals 
Under Scott Pruitt and (since his departure) Andrew Wheeler, EPA has played a pivotal 
role in implementing Trump’s deregulatory agenda. In addition to initiating the review of all 
major greenhouse gas emission standards (discussed below), EPA has also introduced several 
overarching policies and proposals that have cross-cutting implications for future regulatory 
processes, including actions to revoke, amend, or reinstate emission standards.  
                                                 
25 For a more detailed comparison of President Trump’s proposed budget cuts and final budget decisions in the 
FY2018 omnibus spending package, see Rob Cowin, How Did Climate and Clean Energy Programs Fare in the 108 Federal 
Budget? UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS BLOG (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/6EAP-MHBK.  
26 For an overview of cuts to international climate finance, see Joe Thwaites, US 2018 Budget and Climate Finance: It’s 
Bad, but Not As Bad As You Might Think, WRI BLOG (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/RYX8-2SC2. 
27 Id. 
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Shortly after Pruitt was appointed EPA Administrator, he announced what he called a 
“back-to-basics” agenda, a central tenet of which was “creating sensible regulations that enhance 
economic growth.”28 The agenda was announced at a press conference with coal miners, where 
Pruitt expressed strong support for revitalizing the coal industry after it “was nearly devasted by 
years of regulatory overreach.”29 Pruitt cited the review of the Clean Power Plan as a prime 
example of how this agenda would benefit the coal industry.30 This set the tone for EPA’s 
subsequent review of greenhouse gas emission standards and other rules affecting the fossil fuel 
industry. While Pruitt has since stepped down as EPA administrator, his acting successor 
Andrew Wheeler is continuing with the same course of action pursuant to the President’s orders. 
EPA has also undertaken two cross-cutting regulatory initiatives with important 
implications for climate-related rulemakings. The first was a proposal to restrict the use of 
scientific evidence in rulemaking. The proposed rule, misleadingly labeled “Strengthening 
Transparency in Regulatory Science,” would bar EPA from using scientific studies in the 
development of significant new regulations unless the underlying data “are publicly available in 
a manner sufficient for independent validation.”31 The chief concern with this proposal is that it 
will block the use of much valid, peer-reviewed, and highly relevant research on pollution and 
public health effects, because many studies depend on data that cannot legally be made public. 
For example, the proposal would prevent EPA from using studies that rely on confidential patient 
information, which is a critical element of studies showing the health impacts of pollutants.32  
The EPA Science Advisory Board has pushed back against these efforts to restrict science 
in rulemaking and has requested an opportunity to weigh in on the proposed rule before the 
administration proceeds further.33 In the letter requesting review, the Board noted that the rule 
                                                 




31 EPA, Proposed Rule: Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18768 (Apr. 30, 2018). 
32 For further explanation, see The Medical Society Consortium on Climate & Health, Talking Points on Proposed Rule 
“Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science” (June 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/4WJE-N2XY 
33 Science Advisory Board, EPA Office of the Administrator, Letter to EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Science 
Advisory Board (SAB) Consideration of EPA Proposed Rule: Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science 
(June 28, 2018), available at: https://perma.cc/RLM5-PMWX. 
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could have far reaching consequences and urged EPA to heed public input on this matter.34 The 
Board also published an internal memorandum in which it noted certain concerns about the 
proposal, including the fact that it “fails to mention that there are various ways to assess the 
validity of the prior epidemiologic studies without public access to data and analytic methods,” 
that it “oversimplifies” arguments in favor of the rule, and that it overlooks key reasons for why 
data (particularly patient data) may need to be kept confidential.35 
The second initiative with important implications for climate-related rulemakings is 
EPA’s ANPR soliciting comment on whether and how it should promulgate regulations 
“clarifying” its approach to cost-benefit analysis under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, 
and other environmental statutes.36 In the press release accompanying the ANPR, Pruitt stated 
that EPA was undertaking this action due to concerns that the “previous administration inflated 
the benefits and underestimated the costs of its regulations through questionable cost-benefit 
analysis.”37 If EPA proceeds with this proposal, it could have implications for how EPA will 
weigh costs and benefits in future rulemakings. EPA has already modified its cost-benefit analysis 
for several rules to justify the repeal of those rules and may seek to codify these changes in the 
regulation. For example, to support its proposal to repeal the Clean Power Plan (discussed 
below), EPA adopted a new cost-benefit analysis wherein it: (i) confined its estimates of the social 
cost of carbon to “domestic bounds” and increased the discount rate applied to those estimates, 
dramatically reducing the projected costs of CO2 emitted in the year 2030 from $50 to $1 per ton, 
(ii) downplayed or ignored the air pollution co-benefits of climate regulations, and (iii) inflated 
the estimated compliance costs by changing how it accounts for energy savings.38 
It remains to be seen how EPA will proceed with these two rulemakings or whether they 
will be upheld in court, as there is no clear statutory basis for either of them. In the meantime, as 
                                                 
34 Id. at 3. 
35 Alison Cullen, Chair, EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) Work Group on EPA Planned Actions for SAB 
Consideration of the Underlying Science, Memorandum re: Preparations for Chartered SAB Discussions of Proposed 
Rule: Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science RIN 2080-AA14 (May 12, 2018), available at 
https://perma.cc/9C87-2QJB. 
36 EPA, ANPR: Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the Rulemaking 
Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 27524 (June 13, 2018). 
37 Press Release, EPA Headquarters, EPA Administrator Pruitt Proposes Cost-Benefit Analysis Reform (June 7, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/JC38-KLSM. 
38 See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Review of the Clean Power Plan: Proposal (Oct. 2017). 
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discussed below, EPA continues to move forward with efforts to repeal and otherwise undermine 
existing protections – including greenhouse gas emission standards for stationary and mobile 
sources, product standards for hydrofluorocarbons (a particularly potent class of greenhouse gas 
emissions), and other environmental standards aimed at internalizing externalities associated 
with fossil fuel use. 
 
B. Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Stationary and Mobile Sources  
EPA possesses the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air 
Act. This issue was decided by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA – a lawsuit brought by 
twelve states and several cities challenging EPA’s failure to act on a petition to regulate 
greenhouse gases from motor vehicles under section 202 of the Act.39 The critical questions in that 
case were: (i) whether plaintiffs had standing to sue, (ii) whether greenhouse gases qualified as 
“air pollutants” that EPA was authorized to regulate under the Act, and (iii) whether EPA could 
decline to exercise that authority “because regulation would conflict with other administration 
priorities.”40 The Supreme Court found that the State of Massachusetts, at least, had standing to 
sue.  It concluded that greenhouse gases did qualify as “air pollutants” within the meaning of the 
Act, and thus EPA had authority to regulate those emissions if it concluded that they endangered 
public health and welfare, and EPA could not decline to regulate these emissions based on 
political, social, or economic considerations not enumerated in the statutory text.41 The Supreme 
Court reaffirmed EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in American Electric Power 
v. Connecticut, where it held that the Clean Air Act grant of authority displaced federal common 
law nuisance claims pertaining to greenhouse gas emissions.42  
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Clean Air Act is an available tool for 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Granted, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court did not 
explicitly hold that greenhouse gases from motor vehicles or any other source category do 
endanger public health and welfare (as this issue was remanded to EPA to decide). However, to 
                                                 
39 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
40 Id. at 527. 
41 Id. at 530-35. 
42 American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
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establish jurisdiction, the Court had to analyze whether the failure to regulate emissions gave rise 
to a sufficiently imminent and concrete injury for the purposes of Article III standing. The Court 
concluded that such an injury did exist and cited various facts and concessions to support this 
conclusion. For example, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted that: 
The harms associated with climate change and serious and well recognized. Indeed, [a 
2001 National Research Council Report] – which EPA regards as an ‘objective and 
independent assessment of the relevant science,’ – identifies a number of environmental 
changes that have already inflicted significant harms, including ‘the global retreat of 
mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of ice on 
rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th century 
relative to the past few thousand years…’.”43 
Justice Stevens further noted that EPA (then under the administration of President George W. 
Bush) did not dispute the causal connection between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
and global warming, and thus, at a minimum, EPA’s refusal to regulate such emissions 
“contribute[d] to the petitioners’ injuries.”44 The Court dismissed the argument that this 
contribution was too insignificant to provide a basis for standing because EPA regulations would 
only target a small proportion of overall global emissions. The Court explained that “accepting 
this premise would doom most challenges to regulatory actions” because regulations frequently 
only deal with a piece of a larger overall problem.45 The Court’s standing analysis put EPA on 
notice that the Court understood the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions and it was therefore 
highly unlikely that the Court (at least as then constituted) would uphold a subsequent finding 
from EPA of no endangerment.  
On remand from that case, EPA issued a formal endangerment finding in which it 
concluded that six greenhouse gases – CO2, CH4, N2O, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) – threatened public health and welfare.46 
In the same action, EPA issued a separate finding that emissions from motor vehicles caused or 
                                                 
43Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521. 
44 Id. at 523. 
45 Id. at 524. The Court also noted that “reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly a tentative step” in light of 
the significant quantities of greenhouse gases produced by U.S. motor vehicles each year. Id. at 524-25. 
46 EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air 
Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
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contributed to the threat to public health and welfare associated with climate change.47 While the 
“cause or contributes” finding was specific to motor vehicles, the endangerment finding was 
broadly worded such to encompass all sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and  EPA was 
therefore able to use it as the basis for regulating emissions from multiple source categories. The 
endangerment finding was upheld by a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court accepted its validity.48 By the end of the Obama 
administration, EPA had promulgated greenhouse gas emissions standards for motor vehicles, 
power plants, oil and gas facilities, and municipal landfills.  
A regulatory approach was not the Obama administration’s first choice for controlling 
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.  The administration proposed to amend the 
Clean Air Act to adopt an economy-wide cap-and-trade program – a way to use a market 
mechanism to induce greenhouse gas reductions.  This program was incorporated into the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act, better known as the Waxman-Markey Bill.  It passed 
the House of Representatives by a vote of 219-212 on June 26, 2009.  However, the companion bill 
died in the Senate in 2010, and the outcomes of the subsequent Congressional elections made it 
clear that no climate legislation could be achieved during President Obama’s time in office. Thus, 
lacking the ability to pursue its preferred market-based approach, the administration pivoted to 
the use of the command-and-control techniques provided by the existing Clean Air Act.  The 
statute is not well suited to control of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly from existing 
sources (such as coal-fired power plants). The Obama EPA did its best to thread the needle in 
drafting the Clean Power Plan and other greenhouse gas regulations. However, this approach 
attracted serious legal and political opposition, both from affected industries and from a number 
of states. As noted below, while legal challenges to the Clean Power Plan were pending before 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court in February 2016 took the unprecedented 
step of staying implementation of the Clean Power Plan. 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub 
nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), and amended sub nom. Coal. for Responsible 
Regulation, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 606 F. App'x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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The Trump administration has since initiated the process of reviewing and reconsidering 
these rules and has already proposed to repeal or replace certain standards, most notably the 
emission standards for existing power plants. However, despite the urgings of some, the 
administration has not taken any steps to repeal the 2009 endangerment finding.  In the years 
since 2009 the scientific evidence supporting the endangerment finding has become considerably 
stronger. 
 
1. Clean Power Plan (CO2 Emission Guidelines for Existing Power Plants) 
The Clean Power Plan, finalized in 2015, established CO2 emission guidelines for existing 
fossil fuel-fired power plants under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.49 This rule, which sought 
to control one of the largest emission sources in the country, was heralded as the centerpiece of 
the Obama administration’s efforts to address climate change.  
Under Section 111(d),  EPA may set performance standards for existing sources within a 
particular source category.50 The performance standards must reflect “the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emissions reduction [BSER] 
taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health and 
environmental impact and energy requirements.”51 EPA has the authority under this section to 
issue “emission guidelines” setting forth the performance level that is achievable applying the 
BSER (e.g., expressed as an emissions rate) as well as procedural requirements that states must 
follow when implementing section 111(d).52 States would then submit plans for meeting these 
standards. EPA can reject state plans and even substitute a federal implementation plan if needed 
to control emissions under this provision.53 
                                                 
49 EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources; Electric Utility Generating Units; Final 
Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (hereinafter “Clean Power Plan”). 
50 Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
51 Clean Air Act § 111 (a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
52 Franz T. Litz et al., What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry? Using the Clean Air Act to Reduce Emissions, Building 
on Existing Regional Programs (World Resources Institute 2011); Christopher E. Van Atten, Structuring Power Plan 
Emissions Standards Under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act – Standards for Existing Power Plants (M.J. Bradley & 
Associates LLC, 2013). 
53 Daniel P. Selmi, Federal Implementation Plans and the Path to Clean Power, 637 GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. REV. 637 (2016). 
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For existing fossil fuel-fired power plants, EPA determined that the BSER consisted of on-
site heat rate improvements at power plants as well as fuel switching to natural gas and zero-
emitting renewable energy sources. Based on that BSER definition, EPA calculated regional CO2 
emission performance rates for coal plants and natural gas power plants and then used this 
information to calculate statewide emission reduction targets based on the mix of energy sources 
within the state and region. EPA anticipated that the rule would reduce CO2 emissions from 
existing power plants 32% below 2005 levels by 2030, resulting in public health and climate 
benefits worth an estimated $34 - $54 billion per year by 2030.54 
Industry groups and states immediately challenged the final rule in the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals, arguing that it exceeded EPA’s authority.55 In February 2016, the Supreme Court put 
the rule on hold pending the outcome of that case.56 The judicial stay has remained in effect since 
then. 
Throughout his campaign, Trump promised to repeal the Clean Power Plan.  Just over 
two months after the inauguration, on April 4, 2017, EPA announced plans to reconsider the rule, 
pursuant to the directives contained in Executive Order 13783.57 That same day, EPA withdrew 
proposed rules for a Model Trading Program and Clean Energy Incentive Program that would 
have assisted states in implementing the Clean Power Plan.58 EPA also asked the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals to hold the rule litigation in abeyance during its reconsideration process.59 The 
court granted that initial request as well as all subsequent abeyance requests, and the litigation 
remains on hold.60 
                                                 
54 EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, EPA-452/R-15-003 (Aug. 2015), available at 
https://perma.cc/HE2S-EV3J. 
55 West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
56 Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773 (S. Ct. Feb. 9, 2016). 
57 EPA, Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16329 (Apr. 4, 2017). 
58 EPA, Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric 
Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework 
Regulations; and Clean Energy Incentive Program Design Details, 82 Fed. Reg. 16144 (Apr. 3, 2017). 
59 Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcoming Rulemaking, And Motion to Hold 
Case in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/32LQ-
PVRG. 
60 Order Granting Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/HC7Y-SS29; Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 
8, 2017), available at  https://perma.cc/B2R6-SVSC; Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-
1363 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 9, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/BL8X-6VKJ; Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, West 
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On October 16, 2017, EPA published a proposal to repeal the Clean Power Plan, 
accompanied by a revised regulatory impact analysis (RIA) aimed at justifying the repeal.61  EPA 
had originally estimated that the Clean Power Plan would generate $25 to $45 billion in net 
benefits per year by 2030, but in the new RIA, EPA concluded that the repeal of the plan could 
generate anywhere from $28.3 billion in net costs to $14 billion in net benefits by 2030.62 
Commentators have criticized EPA for manipulating its cost-benefit analysis to achieve these new 
results.63  
On December 28, 2017, EPA issued an ANPR to replace the Clean Power Plan in which it 
solicited comment on what should be included in a new potential rule to regulate CO2 from 
existing power plants under Section 111(d).64 In August 2018, EPA published a proposed 
replacement rule for regulating greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants, which it 
labeled the “Affordable Clean Energy” (ACE) rule.65  
The proposed rule would require far fewer emission reductions. EPA is proposing to 
define the BSER as heat rate efficiency improvements that can be implemented on-site at existing 
power plants. This means that the performance standards issued pursuant to the rule would only 
reflect the emission reductions that can be achieved through on-site energy efficiency measures, 
and would not reflect the much greater emission reductions that could be achieved by replacing 
emission-intensive power sources with cleaner sources of power or actions aimed at improving 
end-use energy efficiency. It is possible that the administration’s proposed approach will fail to 
                                                 
Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/6MBB-LBG2; Order Issuing 
Continuing Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/KG22-
KTSQ. 
61 EPA, Proposed Rule: Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (Oct. 16, 2017); EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Review of the Clean 
Power Plan: Proposal (Oct. 2017). 
62 For a discussion of how EPA altered its approach to cost-benefit analysis, see Kate Shouse, EPA’s Proposal to Repeal 
the Clean Power Plan: Benefits and Costs, CRS Report No. 45119 (Feb. 28, 2018). 
63 See, e.g., Alan J. Krupnick & Amelia Keyes, Hazy Treatment of Health Benefits: The Case of the Clean Power Plan, 
Resources for the Future Blog (Oct. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/67AM-JDBR; Kevin Steinberger & Starla Yeh, Pruitt 
Cooks the Books to Hide Clean Power Plan Benefits (Oct. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/5QAP-LH6S.. 
64 EPA, ANPR: State Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 
Fed. Reg. 61507 (Dec. 28, 2017). 
65 EPA, Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions 
to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 
(Aug. 31, 2018). 
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ensure any emissions reductions at all insofar as there may be a “rebound effect” wherein plants 
that implement heat-rate improvements may be called upon to run more hours, thus increasing 
the total amount of CO2 generated (even if the rate of CO2 emissions decreases).  
The proposed rule also differs from the Clean Power Plan insofar as it does not contain 
any numerical targets for states, but rather leaves it up to states to establish their own 
performance standards based on the BSER definition. EPA is also proposing to let states set 
weaker standards based on their assessment of the plant’s “remaining useful life”. Many 
environmentalists are concerned that the rule essentially allows states to decide how much to cut 
emissions, if at all, rather than establishing enforceable quantitative targets. 
EPA prepared another RIA for the proposed ACE rule in which it found that replacing 
the Clean Power Plan with the proposed rule would result in billions of dollars of net “foregone 
benefits” (i.e., costs) under every scenario it analyzed.66 Notably, EPA reached this conclusion 
even after applying its new methodology for calculating costs and benefits in climate-related 
rulemakings. 
As noted above, the original Clean Power Plan is not currently in effect due to the 
Supreme Court stay. But many of the objectives of the plan are nonetheless being met, as coal use 
in the U.S. continues to decline, and coal plants are being retired each year due to legal, social, 
and economic factors beyond the administration’s control.67 This trend will likely continue 
regardless of whether the administration is successful in replacing the Clean Power Plan. 
 
2. CO2 Emission Standards for New Power Plants 
On the same day that EPA issued the Clean Power Plan, the agency also promulgated CO2 
emission standards for new and modified fossil fuel-fired power plants.68 Section 111 of the Clean 
Air Act requires EPA to issue performance standards for both new and existing sources within 
                                                 
66 EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review 
Program, EPA-452/R-18-006 (Aug. 2018). 
67 See Reid Wilson, Coal Industry Mired in Decline Despite Trump Pledges, THE HILL (Mar. 4, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/AY2P-MX2S; EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook: Coal (July 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/9SYV-69E6. 
68 EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
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the same source category (and the term “new source” is defined to include modified facilities).69 
The language defining the basis for new source performance standards (NSPS) is the same as for 
existing sources – the standards must reflect application of the BSER, taking into account costs 
and non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements.70 However, for 
new sources, EPA promulgates these standards directly rather than issuing emission guidelines 
for states to implement. And of course, the BSER may differ for new and modified sources as 
compared with existing sources. 
EPA determined that the BSER for CO2 emissions from new coal-fired power plants 
should include the installation of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) equipment that would 
capture approximately 16-23% of the CO2 emissions generated (depending on the type of coal) 
and set the corresponding NSPS for new coal-fired power plants at 1,400 lbs CO2/MWh.71 EPA 
established a less stringent NSPS for modified coal-fired power plants, limiting CO2 emissions to 
the level of the facility’s best historical annual performance from 2002 to the time of modification. 
For new natural gas-fired power plants, EPA set an NSPS of 1,000 lbs CO2/MWh, reflecting 
application of efficient natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) technology.72 
As with the Clean Power Plan, the standards were challenged immediately after they were 
issued.73 One of the challengers’ chief contentions was that CCS technologies were not 
“adequately demonstrated” and EPA therefore erred in its determination that the BSER should 
reflect the application of partial CCS.74  
                                                 
69 See Clean Air Act § 111(b) (requiring performance standards for “new sources”), § 111(a)(2) (defining “new source” 
to include “any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of 
regulations), § 111(a)(4) (defining “modification” as “any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, 
a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the 
emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted). 
70 Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C § 7411(a)(1). 
71 80 Fed. Reg. at 64513. 
72 Id. at 64515. 
73 North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law filed an amicus brief 
in this case on behalf of carbon capture and sequestration experts in support of the performance standard. Brief for 
Amici Curiae Carbon Capture and Storage Scientists in Support of Respondents, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/MQ9M-BFAM. 
74 Petitioner State North Dakota’s Statement of Issues To Be Raised, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 
27, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/TWK6-QXB7. 
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Pursuant to Executive Order 13783, EPA announced on April 4, 2017, that it was reviewing 
the rule, and if appropriate, would initiate proceedings to suspend, revise, or rescind the rule.75 
EPA also submitted a request to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to hold the litigation over this 
rule in abeyance pending the outcome of its review process.76 The D.C. Circuit granted EPA’s 
request and suspended the litigation indefinitely in August 2017.77 
On December 6, 2018, EPA issued a proposed rule to weaken the NSPS, increasing the 
emissions rate for coal plants from 1,400 lbs CO2/MWh to 1,900 lbs CO2/MWh for larger units and 
2,000 lbs CO2/MWh for smaller units.78 To justify this increase, the Trump EPA reversed course 
on the Obama EPA’s determination that CCS is an adequately demonstrated technology. Instead, 
EPA has proposed to find that the BSER for this source category is the most efficient demonstrated 
steam cycle in combination with the best operating practices. EPA has also asserted that this 
proposal would result in “negligible changes” in total CO2 emissions and compliance costs 
through 2026, since no new coal-fired power plants are expected to be constructed in that 
timeframe (as they have become uneconomical for other reasons).79 In the meantime, the original 
CO2 performance standards for new fossil fuel-fired power plants remain in effect. 
 
3. Methane Emission Standards for New Oil and Gas Sources 
The oil and gas sector is another major source of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. and 
a key contributor of methane (CH4), which is a more potent greenhouse gas than CO2. During the 
Obama administration, EPA used its authority under section 111(b) of the Clean Air Act to issue 
stationary source performance standards for the oil and gas sector as well as the power sector. 
EPA finalized NSPS for methane (CH4), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and toxic air 
                                                 
75 EPA, Review of the Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 16330 (Apr. 4, 2017). 
76 Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Rule and Forthcoming Rulemaking, and Motion to Hold Cases in 
Abeyance, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/WMC8-PT5M. 
77 Order Issuing Continuing Abeyance, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/8ANU-T3DK. See also Order Granting Abeyance, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15-1381 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 
28, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/NFX3-286T (initial stay of litigation for 60 days). 
78 EPA, Review of Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Pre-Publication Draft), EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495; RIN 2060-
AT56 (Dec. 6, 2018). 
79 Id. at 112. 
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pollutants from the oil and gas sector on June 3, 2016.80 The NSPS rule established different 
performance standards for a variety of oil and gas facilities, including well sites, gathering and 
boosting stations, processing plants, and compressor stations. These standards consisted of 
emission reduction targets (e.g., 95% reduction in methane emissions from centrifugal 
compressors) as well as operational standards (e.g., requiring capture of methane emissions at 
well completion, and requiring monitoring for fugitive emissions and repair of leaks).81 EPA 
estimated that the rule would reduce 510,000 short tons of methane (11 million tons CO2e) per 
year by 2025, yielding corresponding climate benefits of $690 million per year which would 
outweigh the estimated costs of $530 million per year.82 As with the other greenhouse gas 
standards, the final rule was  challenged by industry groups and states on the grounds that it 
exceeded EPA’s authority.83  
The Trump EPA announced that it was reviewing the rule pursuant to Executive Order 
13783 on the same day that it announced the reconsideration process for the power sector 
standards.84 EPA also successfully moved to have the initial lawsuit against the rule held in 
abeyance pending its review of the rule.85 
EPA subsequently issued a Federal Register notice stating that it was granting 
reconsideration of certain requirements in the NSPS, specifically the well site pneumatic pump 
standards and the requirements for certification by a professional engineer, and that it would stay 
                                                 
80 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Final Rule, 
81 Fed. Reg. 35824 (June 3, 2016). 
81 For a summary of the standards, see 81 Fed. Reg. at 35826. 
82 EPA, EPA’s Actions to Reduce Methane Emissions from the Oil and Natural Gas Industry: Final Rules and Draft 
Information Collection Request (2016), https://perma.cc/FA55-R3BR. 
83 North Dakota v. EPA, No. 16-1242 (D.C. Cir. 2016). See also American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, No. 13-1108 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (earlier challenge to 2012 NSPS for oil and gas sector, which was consolidated with North Dakota v. EPA in 
2017). 
84 EPA, Review of the 2016 Oil and Gas New Source Performance Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources, 82 Fed. Reg. 16331 (Apr. 4, 2017). EPA also sent a separate letter to fossil fuel companies that had requested 
reconsideration of the fugitive emission standards stating that it would grant their request. Letter from EPA 
Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Convening a Proceeding for Reconsideration of Final Rule, “Oil and Natural Gas 
Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed and Modified Sources,” published June 3, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 
35824 (Apr. 18, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/8PC3-QEF4. 
85 Order Granting Abeyance, American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, No. 13-1108 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/2Y74-E6QS. 
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those requirements for three months pending reconsideration.86 Environmental groups 
challenged the initial stay, and on July 3, 2017, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that EPA 
had exceeded its authority by issuing the stay without following the APA’s notice and comment 
procedures and ordered EPA to begin implementing the rules.87  
EPA followed the initial three-month stay with a proposed rule to stay the NSPS 
requirements for two years.88 EPA has not finalized the rule adopting the two-year stay. However, 
on March 12, 2018, EPA published a final amendment to the NSPS which would allow leaks to 
go unrepaired during unscheduled or emergency shutdowns, and which would also remove 
monitoring survey requirements for well sites located on the Alaskan North Slope.89 Notably, 
although EPA did solicit comment on these issues in the proposal for the two-year stay, there was 
no formal proposal which preceded this final rule. This raises the question of whether EPA failed 
to comply with APA notice-and-comment requirements when promulgating the March 12 rule. 
On October 15, 2018, EPA published a proposed rule to revise the oil and gas NSPS.90 The 
proposal would rescind or modify many of the key requirements embedded in the original NSPS, 
particularly those pertaining to methane leak detection and repair.91 Two of the key changes 
include reductions in how frequently oil and gas operators would be required to survey for 
methane leaks, and an extension of time provided for leak repair. EPA has estimated that, if these 
proposed changes are implemented, methane emissions from oil and natural gas facilities will 
                                                 
86 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Grant of 
Reconsideration and Partial Stay, 82 Fed. Reg. 25730 (June 5, 2017). 
87 Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
88 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Stay of 
Certain Requirements; Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 27645 (June 16, 2017). See also EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: 
Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Stay of Certain Requirements; Notice of Data 
Availability, 82 Fed. Reg. 51788 (Nov. 8, 2017) (providing supplemental information in support of the stay); EPA, Oil 
and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Three Month Stay of 
Certain Requirements; Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 27641 (June 16, 2017) (proposing an additional 3-month stay to 
ensure that there is no gap between the initial 3-month stay and the start of the 2-year stay) EPA, Oil and Natural Gas 
Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Three Month Stay of Certain 
Requirements; Notice of Data Availability, 82 Fed. Reg. 51794 (Nov. 8, 2017) (providing supplemental information in 
support of the 3-month stay).  
89 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; 
Amendments; Final Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 10628 (Mar. 12, 2018). 
90 EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Proposed 
Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 52056 (Oct. 15, 2018). 
91 For a more detailed description of the proposed rule, see Romany Webb, Five Important Points About EPA’s Revised 
New Source Performance Standards for the Oil and Gas Industry, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Sept. 11, 2018). 
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increase by 380,000 – 480,000 short tons between 2019 and 2015, equivalent to a 4-5% increase in 
total industry methane emissions.92 
Apart from the specific provisions addressed in the March 12 rule, most aspects of the 
methane NSPS for the oil and gas sector remain in effect, pursuant to the D.C. Circuit’s order. A 
lawsuit has not yet been filed to challenge the March 12 rule, possibly due to its limited scope. 
 
4. Methane Emission Standards for Existing Oil and Gas Sources 
EPA had commenced work on 111(d) emission guidelines for methane from existing 
sources the oil and gas sector during the Obama administration but had not finalized these 
guidelines by the time President Trump took office. Specifically, on November 10, 2016, EPA 
issued a final Information Collection Request (ICR) to the oil and gas industry seeking 
information on the availability and cost of emissions controls for existing sources within this 
sector.93 The ICR was the first step in the regulatory process: the intent was to then proceed with 
the promulgation of proposed emission guidelines for this source category. 
The Trump administration reversed course on the development of this rule. On March 2, 
2017, EPA withdrew the ICR and instructed oil and gas companies that they were no longer 
required to respond to the queries contained therein.94 Since no formal proposal or rule had been 
issued, EPA did not initiate a formal review process like it has for finalized regulations.  
On April 5, 2018, fifteen states and the City of Chicago sued EPA for failing to regulate 
methane emissions from existing oil and gas operations, arguing that EPA had violated the Clean 
Air Act by unreasonably delaying the promulgation of this rule.95 The case was filed with the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Oral arguments have not yet been scheduled.  
 
5. Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Motor Vehicles 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to issue performance standards for 
emissions of air pollutants from motor vehicles which, in EPA’s judgment, cause or contribute to 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 EPA, Background on the Information Request for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry, https://perma.cc/9FYK-LQL9. 
94 EPA, Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Obligation to Submit Information, 82 Fed. Reg. 12817 (Mar. 7, 2017). 
95 New York et al. v. Pruitt, 1:18-cv-00773 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.96 As 
discussed above, Massachusetts v. EPA specifically dealt with EPA’s authority and obligation to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under this section. The positive endangerment finding issued 
by EPA following that decision triggered a legal obligation for EPA to promulgate performance 
standards for greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. 
A separate statute requires the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
to establish fuel economy standards for motor vehicles.97 Due to the close relationship between 
fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions, during the Obama administration EPA and NHTSA 
cooperated in a rulemaking process to promulgate joint greenhouse gas emission and corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for motor vehicles. These standards were harmonized 
with California’s fuel economy standards so as to promote nationwide consistency, and 
California was also granted two waivers under section 209 of the Clean Air Act which provided 
the state with independent legal authority to issue the fuel economy standards and also 
authorized the state to adopt additional requirements for vehicles as part of its Advanced Clean 
Cars Program.98 
 
a. Light Duty Vehicles 
On October 16, 2016, EPA and NHTSA adopted joint emission and CAFE standards for 
light duty vehicles model years 2017-2025 which increase over time and are expected to result in 
an average industry fleetwide level of 163 grams / mile of CO2 by model year 2025, equivalent to 
a fuel economy of 54.5 miles per gallon.99 EPA estimated that the standards would reduce 
                                                 
96 Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7522. 
97 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (“Average Fuel Economy Standards”). 
98 EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean 
Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for new 
Motor Vehicles; Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 (Jul. 8, 2009); EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control 
Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car 
Program and a Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for 2018 and 
Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 9, 2013). 
99 EPA & DOT, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62623 (Oct. 15, 2012). 
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greenhouse gas emissions by approximately 2 billion metric tons over the lifetime of the vehicles 
sold in these years, resulting in net benefits to society ranging from $326 to $451 billion.100  
The light-duty rule called for a mid-term evaluation to determine whether the standards 
should be revised for light duty vehicles MY 2022-2025. In January 2017, just before President 
Trump took office, EPA completed its mid-term evaluation and issued a final determination in 
which it concluded that no change was warranted for the MY 2022-2025 standards.101  Many in 
the industry criticized the determination for being rushed, as it came in the final days of the 
Obama administration, several months before the expected date offered in the public timeline. 
On March 15, 2017, the Trump EPA and NHTSA announced their intention to revisit the 
conclusion from the mid-term evaluation.102 On August 10, 2017, EPA and NHTSA announced 
that they were opening a public comment period on the reconsideration of the light-duty emission 
standards for MY 2022-2025, and that they would take comment on whether the MY 2021 
standards were appropriate as well.103 On April 13, 2018, EPA published a notice stating that it 
had completed its reconsideration of the mid-term evaluation, that it was withdrawing the 
Obama administration’s final determination in the mid-term evaluation because the current 
standards were “based on outdated information” and “may be too stringent,” and that it intended 
to initiate a new notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding to revise them.104  
In May 2018, seventeen states, the District of Columbia, and several environmental groups 
filed a lawsuit challenging EPA’s decision to withdraw the Obama administration’s final 
                                                 
100 EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, Regulatory Announcement: EPA and NHTSA Set Standards to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gases and Improve Fuel Economy for Model Years 2017-2025 Cars and Light Trucks, EPA-420-F-12-051 (Aug. 
2012), available at https://perma.cc/STR4-QVX3. 
101 EPA, Final Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards under the Midterm Evaluation, EPA-420-R-17-001 (Jan. 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/34ML-M6F5. 
102 NHTSA & EPA, Notice of Intention To Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 14671 (Mar. 22, 
2017). 
103 EPA Press Release: EPA, DOT Open Comment Period on Reconsideration of GHG Standards for Cars and Light 
Trucks (Aug. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/LF7B-PCVP. See also NHTSA & EPA, Request for Comment on 
Reconsideration of the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for 
Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicles; Request for Comment on Model Year 2021 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. 39551 (Aug. 21, 2017). 
104 EPA, Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty 
Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16077 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
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determination from the midterm evaluation and issue a new final determination reaching the 
opposite conclusion on the reasonableness of the vehicle standards.105 EPA and industry 
intervenors have moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the revised final determination was not 
a “final agency action” subject to judicial review. The light-duty emission standards remain in 
effect pending review by the administration and the outcome of this case. On November 21, 2018, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order allowing the case to proceed without ruling on 
the motions to dismiss.106  
In August 2018, EPA and NHTSA published a proposed rule to weaken the light-duty 
vehicle emission and fuel economy standards. The proposal – entitled the “Safer and Affordable 
Efficient Vehicles Proposed Rule for Model years 2021-2026” – would freeze the light-duty vehicle 
standards for MY 2021-2026 at 2020 levels, rather than having the standards become more 
stringent over time as provided for in the original rule.107 It would also revoke the waiver allowing 
California to establish more stringent standards which other states can then adopt.  As indicated 
by the title of the proposal, the administration’s primary justification for the rule is that it will 
make new vehicles more affordable and save lives by increasing access to those new vehicles. 
Many governmental and non-governmental organizations have expressed opposition to the rule 
and raised serious questions about the underlying economic and safety analyses, and twenty 
states have already signaled their intent to sue if the proposal is finalized.108 
 
b. Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles 
EPA and NHTSA also promulgated joint CAFE and emission standards for medium- and 
heavy-duty vehicles (e.g., large trucks and vans).  The standards for heavy-duty vehicles MY 
2018-2027 were finalized in August 2016.109 EPA anticipated that the standards would reduce CO2 
                                                 
105 California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
106 Order, California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir.  Nov. 21, 2018). 
107 EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model years 2021-2026 Passenger 
Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 32817 (Aug. 24, 2018). 
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Trump Administration Attacks Consumers, Climate, and 
States with Indefensible new Vehicle Proposal (Aug. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/DGW2-JTSK; Press Release, New York 
State Attorney General, A.G. Underwood: We Will Sue Over EPA Rollback of Clean Car Rule (Aug. 2, 2018) 
(containing joint statement from 20 state attorney generals expressing their intent to sue if this rule is finalized). 
109 EPA & NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines 
and Vehicles—Phase 2; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 73478 (Oct. 25, 2016). 
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emissions by approximately 1.1 billion tons over the lifetime of vehicles built in these years, 
saving vehicle owners an estimated $170 billion in avoided fuel costs and $230 billion in net 
benefits to society.110 
The Trump Administration has not announced plans to review and potentially revise or 
repeal these standards as a general matter. However, responding to industry concerns, EPA 
issued a proposal on November 16, 2017 to repeal the emissions standards set for heavy-duty 
glider vehicles, glider engines, and glider kits based on a proposed re-interpretation under which 
these items would be found not to constitute “new motor vehicles” under the Clean Air Act.111 
(Glider vehicles employ old engines in new chasses.) This action was taken in direct response to 
a petition for review of the application of the rule to gliders submitted by several glider 
manufacturing companies on July 11, 2017. EPA also issued a notice to small manufacturers and 
suppliers of glider vehicles assuring them that it would not take action to enforce the rule for 
these manufactures on July 6, 2018, but this “no action assurance” was immediately stayed by the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and then revoked by the Acting EPA Administrator.112  
The Trump administration may also soon take action to address another industry 
challenge – specifically, with respect to the application of the rule to trailers – which was filed by 
several trailer manufacturers in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on December 22, 2016.113 The 
D.C. Circuit has granted motions to hold the case in abeyance pending the administration’s 
review of that aspect of the rule, and has also stayed the application of the rule to trailers pending 
judicial resolution of the case.114 
 
                                                 
110 EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, Regulatory Announcement: EPA and NHTSA Adopt Standards to 
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Improve Fuel Efficiency of Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles for Model Year 2018 and 
Beyond, EPA-420-F-16-044 (Aug. 2016), available at https://perma.cc/KQK3-JLQ2. 
111 EPA, Proposed Rule; Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits, 82 
Fed. Reg. 53442 (Nov. 16, 2017). 
112 See EPA, Conditional No Action Assurance Regarding Small Manufactures of Glider Vehicles (July 6, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/2GZC-65YR; Order Granting Administrative Stay, Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, No. 18-1190 
(D.C. Cir. July 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/WN82-574U; EPA, Withdrawal of Conditional No Action Assurance 
Regarding Small Manufacturers of Glider Vehicles (July 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/8XKJ-VA7E.  
113 Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
114 Order Granting Abeyance, Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 
2017), available at https://perma.cc/XJL3-TRMK; Order Continuing Abeyance, Truck Trailer Manufacturers 
Association, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16-1430 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/8WAN-3PAP. 
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c. Penalties for Non-Compliance 
In addition to the new emissions and fuel economy standards, the Obama administration 
also promulgated regulations which increased penalties on automakers that do not comply with 
the standards. NHSTA published a final rule on December 28, 2016, which increased the 
maximum fines from $5.50 to $14 for every tenth of an mpg and allowed adjustments for inflation 
between the publication date and the assessment of the violation.115 The rule was issued in direct 
response to a law passed by Congress in 2015 requiring agencies to adjust fines for inflation.116 
The Trump administration has since initiated its review of this rule. On July 12, 2017, 
NHTSA announced that it would indefinitely delay the effective date of the rule increasing 
penalties,117 and in a separate notice, NHTSA announced that it would reconsider and potentially 
revise the rule.118 The stated rationale for reconsideration was that the final rule did not 
adequately account for potential negative economic impacts caused by increasing the fines.119 
Several states and environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging NHTSA’s delay of 
the original rule.120 On April 23, 2018, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petitioners’ 
request and vacated the rule which delayed the effective date for the increased penalties.121 That 
initial order was followed by an opinion, dated June 29, 2018, in which the Second Circuit panel 
explained that NHTSA lacked authority to indefinitely delay the adjustments to the civil penalties 
that were called for by the 2015 statute.122 The panel confronted the Trump administration’s 
argument that agencies possess “inherent authority” to reconsider final rules published in the 
Federal Register, noting that the agency must always abide by the notice-and-comment provisions 
of the APA before taking formal regulatory action of this nature (e.g., delaying, modifying, or 
rescinding a rule). In addition, the panel disagreed that it was “in the public interest” for NHTSA 
                                                 
115 NHTSA, Civil Penalties; Final Rule, Response to Petition for Reconsideration; Response to Petition for 
Rulemaking, 81 Fed. Reg. 95489 (Dec. 28, 2016). 
116 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74 (2015). 
117 NHTSA, Civil Penalties; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 32139 (July 12, 2017). 
118 NHTSA, Civil Penalties; Reconsideration of Final Rule; Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 32140 (July 12, 2017). 
119 Id. at 32142. 
120 NRDC v. NHTSA, No. 17-2780 (2d Cir. 2017). 
121 Order Granting Petitions, NRDC v. NHTSA, No. 17-2780 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2017). 
122 NRDC v. NHTSA, 2018 WL 3189321 (2d Cir. 2018) 
 A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections 
 
 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School 28 
  
to suspend the rule without taking comment, reasoning that the public interest would best be 
served through adherence to notice-and-comment procedures.  
 
6. Methane Standards for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills 
The Obama EPA issued NSPS and existing source guidelines for municipal solid waste 
(MSW) landfills on August 29, 2016.123 The rules require large landfills124 to install and operate a 
gas collection system within 30 months after the landfill gas emissions reach a certain threshold.125 
The rules also contain provisions pertaining to emissions monitoring and capping and removing 
the landfill gas collection-and-control system when the landfill is closed or no longer generating 
substantial quantities of emissions. EPA anticipated that the standards would reduce 334,000 tons 
CH4 (8.2 million tons CO2e) and 303,000 tons of CO2 per year by 2025. 
Industry groups filed an initial challenge to the rule in October 2016.126 The D.C. Circuit 
has since granted EPA’s requests to hold the case in abeyance pending its reconsideration of the 
rule.127  
On May 5, 2017, the Trump EPA announced that it would reconsider certain provisions 
of the methane standards for new and existing landfills in response to a petition from industry 
groups raising objections to those provisions.128 Specifically, EPA planned to reconsider 
requirements for emission monitoring, reporting, and corrective actions, among other things.129 
On May 22, 2017, EPA announced a 90-day administrative stay of both standards pending its 
                                                 
123 EPA, Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 59332 (Aug. 29, 2016).  
124 “Large landfills” are those with a capacity of at least 2.5 million metric tons and at least 2.5 million cubic meters of 
waste. 81 Fed. Reg. at 59333. 
125 Specifically, the requirement kicks in when emissions of non-methane organic compounds reach a threshold of 34 
metric tons or more per year. 81 Fed. Reg. at 59334. 
126 National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA, No. 16-1371 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
127 Order Granting Abeyance, National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA, No. 16-1371 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2017); 
Order Continuing Abeyance, National Waste & Recycling Association v. EPA, No. 16-1371 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2017). 
128 Letter from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Convening a Proceeding for Reconsideration of final rules entitled 
"Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," 81 Fed. Reg. 59332 and "Emission Guidelines and 
Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," 81 Fed. Reg. 59276, both published August 29, 2016 (May 5, 
2017), https://perma.cc/7S5D-PPC5. 
129 Id. at 2. 
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reconsideration of the rules pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order on Energy 
Independence.130 The 90 day stay expired on August 29, 2017, so the standards remain in effect. 
On June 16, 2017, environmental and conservation groups filed a lawsuit challenging 
EPA’s decision to stay the landfill methane standards.131 The petitioners eventually agreed to 
voluntary dismissal of the case after the stay had expired and EPA withdrew its plans for further 
delay in implementation of the standards. The petitioners stipulated that they consented to the 
dismissal on the basis of EPA’s representations that the stay only affected deadlines that would 
have applied during the 90 days the stay was in effect, that EPA was not aware of new landfills 
affected by the stay, and that the stay did not affect deadlines for existing landfills or for EPA 
obligations. 
Eight states filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California on May 31, 2018, alleging 
that EPA had failed to fulfill its statutory duty to implement and enforce the emission guidelines 
for existing sources.132 More specifically, petitioners alleged that “instead of working to support 
and ensure compliance with the Emission Guidelines, EPA has worked to undermine—for 
example, by communicating that it has no intent to respond to state plans or to impose a federal 
plan on states that did not impose a state plan—in clear derogation of its statutory and regulatory 
duties.”133 To support this allegation, the petitioners cited several examples of EPA’s 
implementation failure: (i) EPA had not yet approved any state plans,134 (ii) EPA had failed to 
review their state plan submissions or respond to their queries about the development of these 
plans,135 (iii) after failing to respond to multiple inquiries from the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB), EPA sent a letter to CARB stating that “at this time we do not plan to prioritize the review 
of submitted state plans nor are we working to issue a Federal Plan for states that failed to submit 
a state plan” and suggesting that it would not prioritize these issues until after it had completed 
                                                 
130 EPA, Stay of Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills and Emission Guidelines and 
Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 82 Fed. Reg. 24878 (May 31, 2017). 
131 NRDC v. Pruitt, No. 17-1157 (D.C. Cir 2017). 
132 California v. EPA, No. 4:18-cv-03237 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
133 States’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ¶ 3, California v. EPA, No. 4:18-cv-03237 (N.D. Cal. May 
31, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/W3L5-LBNN. 
134 Id. at ¶ 53. 
135 Id. at ¶¶ 49-50. 
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its reconsideration of the rule in 2020.136 The district court has not yet issued any rulings in that 
case. 
EPA has continued to move forward with plans to modify the emission guidelines. On 
October 30, 2018, EPA published a proposed rule which would postpone the due date for state 
plans promulgated pursuant to the methane emission guidelines from May 30, 2017 to August 
29, 2019.137 In that proposal, EPA also took comment on whether it should amend the guidelines 
to require states to resubmit their plans in accordance with new guidelines. 
 
C. Product Standards for Hydrofluorocarbons 
During the Obama administration, EPA also issued product standards aimed at reducing 
the production and use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), a particularly potent class of greenhouse 
gas emissions. EPA had approved the use of HFCs as a substitute for ozone-depleting 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) in the 1990s, pursuant to its 
authority under Section 612 of the Clean Air Act. Section 612 establishes a “safe alternatives 
policy” which calls for the replacement of ozone depleting substances with alternatives that 
“reduce overall risks to human health and the environment.”138 To implement this policy, Section 
612 directs EPA to evaluate the effects of potential substitutes to ozone depleting substances and 
to designate a list of approved (i.e., safe) alternatives to prohibited ozone depleting substances, 
as well as a list of prohibited alternatives.139 This is known as the “Significant New Alternatives 
Policy” (SNAP) program. 
Since EPA first approved the HFCs as a safe alternative for CFCs and HCFCs, it became 
clear that HFCs were not appropriate alternatives because they are potent greenhouse gases. In 
light of this new information, EPA issued a new SNAP rule in 2015 in which it moved certain 
HFCs with high global warming potential (GWP) from the approved list to the prohibited list and 
established deadlines for phasing out the use of these HFCs in applications such as air 
                                                 
136 Id. at ¶ 52. 
137 EPA, Adopting Subpart Ba Requirements in Emission Guidelines for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills; Proposed 
Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 54527 (Oct. 30, 2018). 
138 Clean Air Act § 612(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(a). 
139 Clean Air Act § 612(c) , 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(c). 
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conditioning, retail food refrigeration, vending machines, aerosols, and foam blowing.140 In the 
same rulemaking, EPA placed several climate-friendlier alternatives on the approved substances 
list.141  
Two foreign manufacturers of products containing HFCs filed a lawsuit challenging the 
2015 rule. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in favor of the petitioners on 
August 8, 2017.142 The court upheld EPA’s authority to move HFCs from the list of safe substitutes 
to the list of prohibited substitutes based on its assessment of public health and environmental 
risks, and in doing so, EPA could prohibit a manufacturer from replacing an ozone depleting 
substance with HFCs. However, the court found that Section 612 did not grant EPA the authority 
to require manufacturers to replace non-ozone depleting substances such as HFCs with more 
environmentally friendly alternatives. The court therefore vacated the rule “to the extent it 
requires manufacturers to replace HFCs with a substitute substance” and remanded to EPA for 
further proceedings.143 The D.C. Circuit denied a rehearing of this case,144 and the Supreme Court 
denied petitions for it to review the decision.145  
On April 13, 2018, EPA announced that it would not enforce the HFC alternatives rule 
until it completed a supplemental rulemaking to address the D.C. Circuit’s partial vacatur of the 
rule.146 Eleven states, the District of Columbia, and NRDC filed a lawsuit challenging EPA’s 
decision to suspend enforcement of the HFC restrictions, arguing that EPA could not suspend the 
rule in its entirety in response to a partial vacatur.147  
 
 
                                                 
140 EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain Substitutes Under the Significant 
New Alternatives Policy Program; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42870 (July 20, 2015). 
141 Id. 
142 Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
143 Id. at 454. 
144 Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 15-1328 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 
2018). 
145 Certiorari – Summary Dispositions, NRDC v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. et al., No. 18-0002 (S. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018); 
Certiorari – Summary Dispositions, Honeywell International v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. et al., No. 17-1703 (S. Ct. Oct. 9, 
2018). 
146 EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Notification of Guidance and a Stakeholder Meeting Concerning the 
Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 18431 (Apr. 27, 2018). 
147 NRDC v. Wheeler, No. 18-1172 (D.C. Cir. 2018); New York v. Wheeler, No. 18-1774 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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D. Other Environmental Standards Affecting Fossil Fuel Use 
The environmental rules targeted for deregulation by the Trump administration are not 
limited to rules aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. There are other environmental 
standards currently under review or revision that have important implications for fossil fuel use 
and the corresponding greenhouse gas emissions. These standards help to internalize some of the 
externalities associated with fossil fuel use (e.g., by requiring operators of coal-fired plants and 
coal ash facilities to pay for pollution control measures) and as a result they create a more level 
playing field for other energy sources to compete with fossil fuels. Three examples are discussed 
below: The Mercury and Air Toxics Standard and the Coal Ash Rule, both of which are currently 
under review, and the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which is not being enforced. All three rules 
would increase the costs of operating coal-fired power plants, and thus accelerate their retirement 
and their replacement by cleaner sources of electricity, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  They 
are therefore important components of the efforts to cause the closure of existing coal-fired power 
plants, which was a major objective of the Clean Power Plan. 
 
1. Mercury and Air Toxics Standard 
EPA issued the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for 
coal and oil-fired power plants, commonly referred to as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
(MATS) rule on February 16, 2012.148 The MATS rule requires facilities to achieve an emissions 
rate for mercury and air toxics consistent with the implementation of the maximum available 
control technology (MACT) for those pollutants. In the same rulemaking, EPA also established 
NSPS for criteria pollutants (PM, NOx, and SO2) from fossil fuel-fired electric utility, industrial, 
commercial, and institutional steam generating units.  
In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court ruled that EPA had improperly failed to consider 
compliance costs at the outset of developing the MATS rule. The rule was remanded to EPA for 
                                                 
148 EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 
(Feb. 16, 2012).  
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further analysis of costs but remained in effect during the remand.149 On April 25, 2016, EPA 
issued a supplemental finding in which it considered compliance costs and concluded that the 
MATS rule was appropriate and necessary.150 Industry opponents again sued EPA, arguing that 
the rule exceeded EPA’s authority.151  
EPA made it clear that it intended to review and potentially revise the rule when it 
requested that the D.C. Circuit delay oral arguments in the case noted above to give it time to 
review the rule. EPA subsequently requested that the litigation be put on hold pending its review 
of the rule, and on April 27, 2017, the D.C. Circuit suspended the case indefinitely.152 On February 
7, 2019, EPA published a proposed rule to revise the supplemental cost finding that it had issued 
in response to Michigan v. EPA. Completely reversing course from its 2016 finding, EPA is 
proposing to determine that the MATS rule is not “appropriate and necessary” based on a revised 
analysis in which it has found that the costs of the rule outweigh its benefits.153 
 
2. Coal Ash Rule 
On April 17, 2015, the Obama EPA issued a rule regulating the disposal of coal combustion 
residuals from electric utilities (commonly known as the “Coal Ash” rule), pursuant to its 
authority under Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).154 The rule 
established requirements pertaining to the operation of coal ash facilities, structural integrity of 
coal ash impoundments, groundwater monitoring and corrective actions, closure and post-
closure, and record keeping and public disclosures. While the rule did not regulate emissions 
from power plants, it did have the effect of internalizing some of the externalities associated with 
coal use (thereby creating additional operating costs for many coal plants). 
                                                 
149 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015). 
150 EPA, Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary To Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From 
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 24420 (Apr. 25, 2016). 
151 Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
152 Order Granting Abeyance, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/Q55X-FA83. 
153 EPA, Proposed Rule: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units-Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 
84 Fed. Reg. 2670 (Feb. 7, 2019). 
154 EPA, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management Systems: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric 
Utilities; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 21302 (Apr. 17, 2015). 
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The rule was challenged by industry groups, environmental groups, and municipalities 
who felt that the rule was either too stringent or not stringent enough.155 After President Trump 
took office, industry challengers petitioned EPA to reconsider specific provisions of the rule, 
including but not limited to provisions at issue in the case. EPA sent a letter to the challengers 
announcing that EPA would reconsider the provisions addressed in their petitions,156 and 
subsequently asked the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to postpone oral arguments until it had an 
opportunity to review and potentially revise the rule.157 The D.C. Circuit granted EPA’s request, 
but not indefinitely.158  
During the litigation, EPA has also taken a number of steps to delegate control over coal 
ash disposal to state regulators. EPA is taking these actions pursuant to the Water Infrastructure 
Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act, enacted in 2016, which authorizes EPA-approved state 
permitting programs to regulate coal ash disposal, so long as the state program is as protective 
as EPA’s promulgated standards.159 EPA issued interim final guidance for state permit programs 
for coal ash disposal on August 15, 2017.160 EPA also published a preliminary approval of 
Oklahoma’s application to regulate coal ash in lieu of the federal program on January 16, 2018 
(Oklahoma was the first state to seek approval).  
On March 1, 2018, EPA proposed amendments to the coal ash rule that would 
“incorporate flexibilities” for utilities and states – for example, by allowing state regulators to 
make determinations about compliance with coal ash disposal standards. The move towards 
granting state regulators greater flexibility and control of the program raises environmental 
concerns because many of the states with coal ash contaminated sites and histories of coal ash 
spills do not have good track records with respect to implementing and enforcing environmental 
protections.161 EPA issued a final rule promulgating many of the proposed amendments on July 
                                                 
155 Utility Solid Waste Activities, et al v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
156 Letter from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt re: Petitions Concerning Coal Combustion Residuals Rule (Sept. 13, 
2017), available at https://perma.cc/C8QZ-XNZR. 
157 Respondents’ Motion to Continue Oral Argument and Hold These Proceedings in Abeyance, Utility Solid Waste 
Activities, et al v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/UG9W-ASPG. 
158 Order Granting Abeyance, Utility Solid Waste Activities, et al v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 2017). 
159 Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. 114-332 (Dec. 16, 2016). 
160 EPA Office of Land and Emergency Management, Coal Combustion Residuals State Permit Program Guidance 
Document; Interim Final (Aug. 2017), available at https://perma.cc/N36N-UTYK. 
161 Earthjustice, Coal Ash Contaminated Sites, https://perma.cc/G9CQ-DNSS. 
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30, 2018.162 EPA has stated that it intends to initiate a second rulemaking to amend other 
provisions of the rule not addressed in this action.163  
A legal challenge has not yet been filed in opposition to the final rule amending the coal 
ash regulations. However, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did issue a decision in the lawsuit 
challenging the original coal ash rule which has implications for  the amendments issued by the 
Trump administration.164 The court held that the original rule was not sufficiently protective of 
public health and welfare because it did not require adequate protections for unlined and 
partially-lined coal ash pits and some storage facilities were improperly exempted. The court also 
rejected all industry claims that the rule was too stringent. EPA thus has a legal obligation to 
make the rule more stringent than that which was enacted by the Obama administration, which is 
exactly the opposite of what EPA accomplished through the March amendments.  Shortly after 
that decision was issued, Hurricane Florence caused the release of large amounts of coal ash in 
North Carolina; this event may make it even more difficult for the Trump administration to 
weaken the standards for coal ash containment.165  
 
3. Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) was issued by EPA on August 8, 2011, to help 
protect interstate air quality.166 The rule establishes a framework for controlling cross-state 
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2) from power plants in upwind states that 
contribute to the formation of particulate matter (PM) and ozone pollution in downwind states, 
thereby interfering with the downwind states’ ability to attain the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for those pollutants.167 CSAPR allows a downwind state to file a “section 126 
petition” asking EPA to regulate pollution from sources in another state when that pollution is 
                                                 
162 EPA, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric 
Utilities; Amendments to the National Minimum Criteria (Phase One, Part One), 83 Fed. Reg. 36435 (July 30, 2018). 
163 Id. at 36436. 
164 Utility Solid Waste Activities Group et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1219 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2018). 
165 Sharon Lerner, Hurricane Florence Released Tons of Coal Ash in North Carolina. Now the Coal Industry Wants Less 
Regulation. THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2018). 
166 EPA, Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of 
SIP Approvals; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48207 (Aug. 8, 2011). 
167 Id. 
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impairing air quality in the petitioning state. If EPA determines action is necessary, it can direct 
the polluting state to address the problem in its State Implementation Plan (SIP) or impose its 
own federal implementation plan (FIP). EPA has since issued several updates to the program, 
and in a 2016 update, it recognized that additional action would likely be needed to fully address 
upwind states’ obligations to control interstate pollution under the Clean Air Act.168 
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of this rule, reversing a D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision vacating the rule.169 Following that decision, EPA began implementing Phase I 
of the CSAPR in 2014, and was scheduled to begin implementing Phase II – which required 
additional emission reductions – in 2017.  
The Trump EPA has not taken any formal measures to review and repeal the rule, but it 
has also not taken measures to implement and enforce the rule (particularly the Phase II 
requirements). Most notably, EPA has not been responding to section 126 petitions in a timely 
manner and has rejected or proposed to reject the petitions that it has finally responded to after 
lengthy delays.170 Delaware, New York, Connecticut, and Maryland have all sued EPA for 
delaying its responses to Section 126 petitions.171 Multiple orders have been issued in these cases 
                                                 
168 In December 2011, EPA supplemented the final rule to cover additional states for certain pollution. EPA has also 
issued minor revisions to the rule’s compliance deadlines since it has been finalized. As of January 2017, the CSAPR 
requires 28 states in the eastern United States to reduce power plant emissions of SO2, annual NOX, and ozone 
seasonal NOX affecting downwind states. See EPA, Federal Implementation Plans for Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and Wisconsin and Determination for Kansas Regarding Interstate Transport of Ozone, 76 Fed. Reg. 
80760 (Dec. 27, 2011); EPA, Rulemaking To Affirm Interim Amendments to Dates in Federal Implementation Plans 
Addressing Interstate Transport of Ozone and Fine Particulate Matter, 81 Fed. Reg. 13275 (Mar. 14, 2016). 
169 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
170 For a detailed timeline of state petitions, EPA extensions and responses, and lawsuits, see Harvard Regulatory 
Rollback Tracker, Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and Section 126 Petitions, https://perma.cc/3LDW-79TK. See also EPA, 
Response to June 1, 2016 Clean Air Act Section 126(b) Petition From Connecticut; Notice of Final Action, 83 Fed. Reg. 
16064 (Apr. 13, 2018); EPA, Response to Clean Air Act Section 126(b) Petitions From Delaware and Maryland; Notice 
of Proposed Action, 83 Fed. Reg. 26666 (June 8, 2018). 
171 Maryland v. EPA, No. 1:17-cv-02873 (D. Md. 2017); Delaware v. EPA, No. 17-1099 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Delaware v. 
EPA, No. 17-1644 (3d Cir. 2017); New York et al. v. EPA, No. 18-cv-00406 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Connecticut v. Pruitt et al., 
No. 3:17-cv-00796 (D. Conn. 2017). 
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requiring EPA to respond to the petitions,172 but EPA has thus far responded to the court orders 
by rejecting the petitions from Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland.173  
EPA has taken several other noteworthy actions with respect to the CSAPR rule. On July 
10, 2018, following up on its prior finding that additional revisions to the rule would likely be 
needed to address certain states’ obligations regarding interstate air pollution, EPA published a 
proposed determination that the rule fully addresses those states’ obligations and that “with the 
CSAPR fully implemented, these states are not expected to contribute significantly to 
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other state with regard to the 2008 ozone 
NAAQS.”174 In other words, EPA is arguing that there is no need for any updates to the CSAPR 
program, despite the implementation and enforcement problems outlined above. Downwind 
states have already expressed opposition to this determination.175 On December 21, 2018, EPA 
issued a final determination containing the same conclusion.176 Shortly thereafter, the states of 
New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, and the City of 
New York filed a lawsuit challenging this final determination on the grounds that it was 
unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious and must therefore be vacated.177  
EPA has also sought to modify CSPAR procedures with revised guidance. On August 31, 
2018, EPA issued a memorandum in which it recommended that regional offices use a higher 
threshold level when determining whether ozone in an upwind state contributes significantly to 
                                                 
172 See Memorandum, Maryland v. EPA, No. 1:17-cv-02873 (D. Md. June 13, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/B9K4-
W5F2; Opinion and Order, New York et al. v. Pruitt, No. 18-cv-00406 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018); Order, Connecticut v. 
Pruitt et al., No. 3:17-cv-00796 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 2018). 
173 See, e.g., EPA, Response to June 1, 2016, Clean Air Act Petition from Connecticut; Notice of Final Action on 
Petition, 83 Fed. Reg. 16064 (Apr. 13, 2018); EPA, Response to Clean Air Act Section 126(b) Petitions from Delaware 
and Maryland; Notice of Final Action on Petition, 83 Fed. Reg. 50444 (Oct. 5, 2018). 
174 EPA, Determination Regarding Good Neighbor Obligations for the 2008 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 31915 (July 10, 2018). 
175 See, e.g., Press Release: Statement from Senator Tom Carper (D-Del) on EPA’s Decision to Deny Further Action on 
Cross-State Air Pollution (June 29, 2018). EPA also decided not to revisit a 2015 rule governing state implementation 
of primary and secondary ozone NAAQS despite prior statements from the Trump Administration indicating that it 
would revisit that rule. Sonal Patel, EPA Will Not Revisit Obama-Era NAAQS for Ozone, POWER MAGAZINE (Aug. 2, 
2018) 
176 EPA, Determination Regarding Good Neighbor Obligations for the 2008 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 65878 (Dec. 21, 2018). 
177 New York et al. v. EPA, No. 19-1019 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 A Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal Climate Protections 
 
 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School 38 
  
nonattainment in a downwind state.178 Specifically, the memorandum recommends using a 
threshold of 1 part per billion (ppb) instead of 0.70 ppb – an increase of nearly 50 percent.  
 
E. Biomass and Wood Burning Stove Policies 
On April 23, 2018, then-Administrator Scott Pruitt issued a policy memorandum which 
stated that EPA would treat CO2 emissions associated with the use of forest biomass for energy 
by stationary sources as carbon neutral in future regulatory actions and EPA programs.179 EPA 
adopted this policy despite the fact that EPA’s own science advisors warned that this policy is 
“inconsistent with the underlying science” showing that forest biomass generates net CO2 
emissions.180 The new policy is consistent with a directive contained in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2018 (H.R. 1625) instructing EPA and other agencies to establish policies that 
“reflect the carbon-neutrality of forest bioenergy and recognize biomass as a renewable energy 
source.”181   
On November 1, 2018, EPA, DOE, and USDA sent a letter to Congress outlining how they 
are carrying out the Congressional mandate mentioned above to ensure that policies “reflect the 
carbon-neutrality of forest bioenergy and recognize biomass as a renewable energy source.” The 
letter states that these agencies “will encourage the use of biomass as an energy solution, striving 
for consistency across federal policies and programs.”182  EPA is currently preparing to propose 
a slate of changes to existing emissions standards for new wood stoves and other wood-fired 
heating appliances, but the precise details of these changes have not yet been released.183  
                                                 
178 EPA, Memorandum: Analysis of Contribution Thresholds for Use in Clean Air Act Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) Interstate 
Transport State Implementation Plan Submissions for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Aug. 1, 2018). 
179 EPA’s Treatment of Biogenic Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions from Stationary Sources that Use Forest Biomass 
for Energy Production (April 23, 2018); Press Release: Administrator Pruitt Promotes Environmental Stewardship 
with Forestry Leaders and Students in Georgia (April 23, 2018). 
180 EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB), SAB Review of Framework for Assessing Biogenic CO2 Emissions from Stationary 
Sources (2014). See also Jennifer Dlouhy, Trump Backs Wood Power Scientists Call Dirtier Than Coal, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 
2018); Chelsea Harvey & NiinaHeikkinen, Congress Says Biomass is Carbon Neutral But Scientists Disagree, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Mar. 23, 2018). 
181 Consolidated Appropriates Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 431 (2018). 
182 Letter from EPA Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler and others to Chairman Richard C. Shelby and others 
(November 1, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/N5FP-6STZ. 
183 Sean Reilly, White House Clears EPA Wood Stove Proposals, E&E NEWS (Nov. 19, 2018). The White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has completed appraisals of two related rulemakings: a proposed rule to 
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IV. Department of Interior 
A. Cross-Cutting Policies and Programs 
DOI is responsible for managing and the use and conservation of natural resources and 
public lands the U.S., including the production of fossil fuels on federal lands and waters.  The 
Obama administration took a number of actions impacting fossil fuel production on federal land, 
often justified by climate considerations.184 The Trump administration has sought to reverse the 
direction of policy under the DOI.  More specifically, under the Trump administration, DOI has 
used its authority to remove barriers to and promote the development of the nation’s energy 
resources under the mantra of “energy dominance.”185 It has issued several cross-cutting policies 
to guide implementation at its constituent agencies. These include: 
Secretarial Order 3349, issued on March 29, 2017, implements the directive from President 
Trump’s Executive Order on Energy Independence and Economic Growth to “immediately 
review existing regulations that potentially burden the development or use of domestically 
produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that unduly 
burden the development of domestic energy resources beyond the degree necessary to protect 
the public interest or otherwise comply with the law.” The order calls for a reexamination of the 
mitigation and climate change policies and guidance that the Department of Interior issued 
                                                 
postpone compliance dates for the wood burning stove emission standards, and an ANPR to solicit comment on 
“issues raised by the public” with respect to the standards. 
184 There is an active debate about whether supply-side measures aimed at restricting fossil fuel production will 
actually reduce fossil fuel consumption and the corresponding greenhouse gas emissions.  Those who favor supply-
side restrictions argue that constraints on the supply of fossil fuels will increase the price of fossil fuels, thereby 
decreasing demand for and consumption of fossil fuels vis-à-vis cleaner energy sources. They also argue that supply-
side restrictions can help avoid fossil fuel “lock-in” (i.e., investments in fossil fuel infrastructure and ongoing reliance 
on fossil fuels for energy needs). Those who oppose supply-side restrictions argue that such measures will not 
meaningfully affect fossil fuel consumption or greenhouse gas emissions because other sources of fuels (e.g., from 
private land or other countries) would serve as a substitute if the federal reserves are not exploited. Some have also 
argued that increasing federal oil and gas production may even reduce greenhouse gas emissions because: (i) 
lifecycle emissions for U.S. oil and gas are lower than lifecycle emissions from foreign oil and gas (particularly oil and 
gas imports); and (ii) the availability of cheaper natural gas will result in the substitution of natural gas for coal.    
185 See DOI, About: Mission, https://www.doi.gov/whoweare (last visited June 3, 2019) (“promot[ing] energy 
dominance” is the first major goal outlined for DOI). 
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during the Obama administration, as well as all regulations related to U.S. oil and natural gas 
development.186 
Secretarial Order No. 3351, issued on May 1, 2017, establishes a new position (Counselor 
to the Secretary for Energy Policy) to help implement policies related to energy development, 
whose duties include: “[d]eveloping and coordinating strategies, policies, and practices that 
promote responsible development of all types of energy on public lands managed and 
administered by the Department;” “[i]dentifying regulatory burdens that unnecessarily 
encumber energy exploration development, production, transportation; and developing 
strategies to eliminate or minimize these burdens;” and “[p]romoting efficient and effective 
processing of energy-related authorizations, permits, regulations, and agreements.”187 
Secretarial Order 3360, issued on December 22, 2017, rescinds the DOI’s climate and 
mitigation policies, including the Departmental Manual on Climate Change Policy, Departmental 
Manual on Landscape-Scale Mitigation Policy, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
Mitigation Manual, and BLM Mitigation Handbook. The order also directs BLM to review the 
Draft Regional Mitigation Strategy for the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and begin 
revisions to ensure it is consistent with the administration’s energy dominance goals.188 
Some of the more targeted actions undertaken by DOI and its constituent agencies to 
implement these policies are discussed below.  
 
B. Removing Barriers to Fossil Fuel Development 
1. Moratorium and Programmatic Review of Federal Coal Leasing 
During the Obama administration, serious concerns were raised about the cumulative 
effects of the federal coal leasing program and whether the program was serving the public 
interest. Responding to these concerns, DOI issued Sectorial Order 3338 on January 15, 2016, 
which directed the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to prepare a Programmatic 
                                                 
186 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3349: American Energy Independence (Mar. 29, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/9N8A-FGL3. 
187 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3351: Strengthening the Department of Interior’s Energy Portfolio (May 1, 2017), 
available at https://perma.cc/T7WP-LH63. 
188 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3360: Rescinding Authorities Inconsistent with Secretary’s Order 3349, “American 
Energy Independence” (Dec. 22, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/6FKY-LH4U. 
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Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) analyzing the cumulative effects of the program as well 
as potential leasing and management reforms that could be enacted to mitigate adverse effects.189 
One key issue to be addressed in the PEIS was the effect of federal coal leasing on greenhouse gas 
emissions, including emissions from the production and consumption of federal coal, and how 
the program should be updated to account for those impacts. DOI also announced a moratorium 
on federal coal leasing during the environmental review and reform process.190 BLM commenced 
the environmental review process in early 2016 and published a scoping document in January 
2017 outlining the key issues to be considered in the PEIS.191 
President Trump’s Executive Order 13771 directed DOI to “take all steps necessary and 
appropriate to amend or withdraw” Secretarial Order 3338, consistent with the President’s goals 
of promoting domestic energy production and revitalizing the coal industry. The order also 
directed DOI to “lift any and all moratoria on Federal land coal leasing activities related to Order 
3338.” On March 29, 2017, DOI issued Secretarial Order 3348, which revoked Order 3338 and 
terminated both the moratorium on federal coal leasing and the programmatic environmental 
review process that had been initiated by BLM.192  
By terminating the programmatic review, DOI revived a 2014 lawsuit aimed at compelling 
the federal government to conduct a programmatic review of the coal leasing program.193 The 
plaintiffs argued that a PEIS was required by NEPA because BLM had not comprehensively 
analyzed the environmental impacts of the coal leasing program since 1979 and the 1979 analysis 
was insufficient because it “only briefly discussed the then-nascent science of the effects of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the federal coal management program’s emissions.”194 In 2015, the 
case was dismissed by a district court judge who reasoned that there was no ongoing major 
                                                 
189 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3338 (2016), supra note 17. 
190 DOI, Fact Sheet: Modernizing the Federal Coal Program (Jan. 16, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/UGX3-X6FS. 
191 BLM, Federal Coal Program Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement – Scoping Report (Jan. 2017), available 
at https://perma.cc/J2DJ-WVN2 (Vol. 1) and https://perma.cc/T7E2-LENY (Vol. 2). 
192 DOI Secretarial Order No. 3348: Concerning the Federal Coal Moratorium (Mar. 29, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/7QLC-J888. 
193 Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Jewell, No. 14-cv-1993 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
194 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Jewell, No. 14-cv-
1993 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 24, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/Q2ZZ-MUKU. 
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federal action that triggered the requirement for supplemental review.195 The petitioners appealed 
to the D.C. Circuit but the case was placed in abeyance when DOI announced that it would 
prepare a PEIS for the program. It was subsequently revived after DOI reversed course and 
terminated the PEIS.  
On June 19, 2018, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s original 
decision and held that NEPA did not require a supplemental programmatic analysis because the 
relevant “major Federal action” was completed in 1979 and no new action had been proposed.196 
The panel noted that the plaintiffs had raised a “compelling argument” that BLM “should now 
revisit the issue” of climate change and “adopt a new program or supplement its PEIS analysis” 
but concluded that the plaintiffs would have to pursue this goal through other channels – for 
example, by challenging specific licensing decisions that are tiered to the outdated 1979 PEIS.197  
However, on April 14, 2019, a district court in Montana held that the administration’s 
decision to terminate the federal coal leasing moratorium (specifically Secretarial Order 3348) was 
a major federal action which triggered NEPA requirements.198 The court found that the 
administration had “circumvented an environmental analysis by characterizing the [order] as a 
mere policy shift and return to the status quo” and that this was a final agency action which 
would have immediate, real-world consequences including potentially significant environmental 
impacts. The court did not specify what form the NEPA review should take but rather remanded 




                                                 
195 Memorandum Opinion, Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Jewell, No. 14-cv-1993 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 
2015), available at https://perma.cc/ZM6E-Y8FT. 
196 Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
197 Id. at 1244. 
198 Citizens for Clean Energy v. DOI, No. 4:17-cv-00030 (D. Mont. April 19, 2019). 
199 One month after that decision, BLM published a draft environmental assessment for lifting the federal coal leasing 
moratorium it which it claims that this action does not have significant environmental impacts because it is simply 
reinstating coal leasing earlier than it otherwise would have (the assumption being that the moratorium would have 
ended by March 2019 upon completion of a PEIS) and thus its action only changes the timing of impacts. BLM only 
provided a 15-day comment period for the draft EA. See BLM, Lifting the Pause on the Issuance of New Federal Coal 
Leases for Thermal (Steam) Coal: Environmental Assessment, DOI-BLM-WO-WO2100-2019-0001-EA (May 22, 2019). 
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2. Methane Emission Controls for Oil and Gas Sources 
During the Obama administration, DOI also took steps to address greenhouse gas 
emissions from oil and gas development on federal lands. The most notable climate protection 
was BLM’s Methane Waste Prevention Rule, published on November 18, 2016.200 The rule aimed 
to reduce waste of natural gas (methane) from oil and gas production activities on federal and 
tribal land by imposing new requirements for flaring, capture, leak detection, and venting. BLM 
projected that the rule could eliminate 175,000-180,000 tons of methane (4.4-4.5 million tons CO2e) 
annually. These requirements were complementary to the requirements set forth in EPA’s 
methane NSPS for the oil and gas sector, one key difference being the scope of the two rules: the 
EPA rule applies to new and modified sources regardless of where they are located, whereas the 
BLM rule applies to all types of sources (new, modified, and existing) located on federal lands. 
The BLM rule was challenged by states and industry groups when it was first issued.201 
On April 4, 2018, the district court in Wyoming reviewing the rule agreed to put the case on hold 
pending the administration’s review of the rule.202 The district court also stayed implementation 
of certain provisions of the rule during this time, specifically the rules pertaining to: 
• Gas capture and percentage requirements203 
• Measuring and reporting volumes of gas vented or flared204 
• Equipment requirements for pneumatic controllers,205 pneumatic diaphragm pumps,206 
and storage vessels207 
• Leak detection and repairs208 
The district court’s order was appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but the appeal was 
dismissed as moot when BLM issued a final rule to replace the 2016 rule.209 
                                                 
200 BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 
83008 (Nov. 18, 2016). 
201 Wyoming vs. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 2:16-CV-00285 (D. Wyo. 2016). 
202 Order Staying Implementation of Rule Provisions and Staying Action Pending Finalization of Revision Rule, 
Wyoming vs. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 2:16-CV-00285 (D. Wyo. Apr. 4, 2018). 
203 43 CFR § 3179.7. 
204 43 CFR § 3179.9. 
205 43 CFR § 3179.201. 
206 43 CFR § 3179.202. 
207 43 CFR § 3179.203. 
208 43 CFR §§ 3179.301 – 3179.305. 
209 Wyoming v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 18-8027 (10th Cir. 2019). 
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The methane waste rule also came under attack by federal legislators. On February 3, 2017, 
the House of Representatives passed a resolution to repeal the rule using the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA).210 However, the Senate ultimately voted against this resolution.211  
Shortly thereafter, the Trump administration initiated proceedings to revise or repeal the 
rule. President Trump’s Executive Order on Energy Independence explicitly called for the review 
of this rule. DOI Secretarial Order 3349 (March 29, 2017) therefore instructed BLM to review the 
methane waste prevention rule and report on whether the rule is fully consistent with the 
executive order’s policy of promoting domestic energy production. 
On June 15, 2017, BLM issued a Federal Register notice announcing that it was temporarily 
postponing the compliance dates for certain provisions of the rule pending the outcome of 
litigation over the rule.212 States successfully challenged this initial postponement of the rule – a 
district court in the northern district of California held that the postponement was unlawful under 
the APA.213 Despite the court ruling, the  BLM continued with its course of action: on October 5, 
2017, BLM issued a formal proposal to suspend key requirements of the rule until January 17, 
2019,214 and on December 8, 2017, BLM finalized that proposal.215 States also challenged this 
suspension rule, and the district court in the northern district of California issued a preliminary 
injunction against the rule.216   
As litigation has progressed, BLM has continued to move forward with proposed 
revisions to the rule. On February 22, 2018, BLM published a proposal to rescind several major 
                                                 
210 H.J. Res. 36, Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the final rule 
of the Bureau of Land Management relating to "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource 
Conservation", 115th Congress (2017-2018). 
211 S.J.Res.11 - A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States 
Code, of the final rule of the Bureau of Land Management relating to "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to 
Royalties, and Resource Conservation", 115th Congress (2018-2018). 
212 BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain 
Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27430 (June 15, 2017). 
213 California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-03804 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
214 BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Delay and Suspension of 
Certain Requirements; Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46458 (Oct. 5, 2017). 
215 BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Delay and Suspension of 
Certain Requirements; Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 58050 (Jan. 8, 2018). 
216 California v. BLM, No. 3:17-cv-07186 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The government appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals but then requested voluntary dismissal of the appeal after publishing the final rule amendments. 
California v. BLM, No. 18-15711 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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provisions, including those governing leak detection and repair and the preparation of methane 
waste minimization plans, and to substantially revise other provisions, including those dealing 
with the amount of methane that can be released through venting and flaring.217 The amendments 
would effectively gut the 2016 rule and reinstate the less stringent standards that were in place 
for oil and gas operations prior to its issuance. BLM issued a final rule implementing these 
changes on September 28, 2018.218  
States and environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging BLM’s decision to repeal key 
provisions of the rule, alleging violations of the APA, the Mineral Leasing Act, and NEPA.219 The 
chief allegations are that BLM violated the APA by failing to offer a reasoned explanation for 
reversing its previous determination that the Methane Waste Prevention Rule was necessary to 
fulfill its statutory mandates, the revised metrics that BLM used to calculate the social cost of 
methane in order to justify the amendments were not based on the best available science, and 
BLM’s conclusion that the repeal would not have significant environmental impacts violated 
NEPA. 
 
3. Streamlining Fossil Fuel Permitting 
During the Trump administration, DOI and its constituent agencies have also 
implemented internal policy changes aimed at streamlining its approval of fossil fuel leases. The 
cross-cutting Secretarial Order 3351 and 3360, discussed above, laid the groundwork for these 
internal changes. In particular, Secretarial Order 3351 established the Counselor to the Secretary 
for Energy Policy and tasked this new official with “[p]romoting efficient and effective processing 
of energy-related authorizations, permits, regulations, and agreements,”220 and Secretarial Order 
3360 withdrew DOI’s climate and mitigation policies (which contained procedural and 
substantive requirements aimed at mitigating harmful environmental effects from DOI land use 
                                                 
217 BLM, Proposed Rule; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Rescission or 
Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (Feb. 22, 2018). 
218 BLM, Final Rule; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 49184 (Sept. 28, 2018). 
219 California v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-05712 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018); Sierra Club v. Zinke, No. 3:18-cv-05984 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 28, 2018). 
220 DOI Secretarial Order 3351 (2017), supra note 187. 
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decisions, including effects on climate).221 BLM subsequently implemented Secretarial Order 3360 
by publishing a new instruction memorandum which prohibits BLM from requiring 
compensatory mitigation from public land users except where the law specifically requires – a 
policy change which will ultimately make it easier and less costly to develop fossil fuels on federal 
lands.222 
DOI has also issued two orders specifically aimed at expediting fossil fuel leasing on 
federal lands and waters: 
• Secretarial Order No. 3350, which directs the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) to develop a new five-year plan for oil and gas exploration in offshore waters and 
to reconsider a number of regulations governing those activities, pursuant to President 
Trump’s Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy. 
• Secretarial Order No. 3354, which directs BLM to “support and improve implementation” 
of quarterly oil and gas lease sales, to “identify options to improve the Federal onshore oil 
and gas leasing program… as well as identify additional steps to enhance exploration and 
development of Federal onshore oil and gas resources,” and “develop an effective strategy 
to address permitting applications efficiently and effectively as well as develop clear and 
actionable goals for reducing the permit processing time.”223 
Pursuant to Order No. 3354, BLM issued an instruction memorandum to its field offices 
on January 31, 2018, which establishes a BLM policy “to simplify and streamline the leasing 
process [for oil and gas] to alleviate unnecessary impediments and burdens, to expedite the 
offering of lands for lease, and to ensure quarterly oil and gas lease sales are consistently held.”224 
The memorandum eliminates the use of Master Leasing Plans (MLPs) — a planning approach 
introduced by the Obama Administration to manage oil and gas activity on sensitive landscapes, 
                                                 
221 DOI Secretarial Order 3360 (2017), supra note 188. 
222 BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 2019-094: Compensatory Mitigation (July 24, 2018). 
223 DOI Secretarial Order 3354: Strengthening and Improving the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program and 
Federal Solid Mineral Leasing Program (July 5, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/AH4H-A6QE. 
224 BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-034: Updating Oil and Gas Leasing Reform – Land use Planning and 
Lease Parcel Reviews (Jan. 31, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/YNP2-4KSW. The U.S. Forest Service has also 
signaled its intent to modify its regulations in order to streamline and expedite the issuance of oil and gas permits on 
National Forest lands. See USFS, Oil and Gas Resources; ANPR, 83 Fed. Reg. 46458 (Sept. 13, 2018). 
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such as national parks, and avoid harmful impacts to sensitive resources.225  The MLPs were used 
to identify and resolve conflicts with resource values such as watersheds and wildlife habitats 
through scientific assessment and stakeholder engagement.226 Prior to the introduction of MLPs, 
BLM made leasing decisions based on Resource Management Plans (RMPs) which specified 
appropriate uses for BLM land units. RMPs are also based on scientific assessment and 
stakeholder engagement. However, RMPs are only updated every 20-30 years, they apply to large 
geographic areas, and they manage many different land uses. BLM therefore introduced the MLP 
process to provide a more tailored and efficient framework for evaluating and managing fossil 
fuel leasing decisions.  Since the MLP process was eliminated, BLM has returned to using RMPs 
for this purpose. 
The instruction memorandum also reduces the amount of time that BLM field offices have 
to review environmental impacts and receive public feedback. It limits the timeframe for parcel 
review for a specific lease sale to six months and limits the amount of time allotted for public 
protest of lease sales to ten days after notice is posted. It also seeks to eliminate opportunities for 
public review and disclosure of environmental impacts from oil and gas development on public 
lands. Specifically, the memorandum states that, where a lease is offered in conformance with an 
approved resource management plan (RMP) that underwent NEPA review, field officers can 
issue a Determination of NEPA Adequacy (DNA) in lieu of preparing an environmental 
assessment (EA) or EIS.227 As discussed below, agencies within DOI have also sought to curtail 
the scope of climate change analysis in NEPA reviews.  
BLM attempted to apply this new policy in issuing oil and gas leases in the habitat of the 
sage grouse – a bird that is in decline across North America due to habitat loss, but which the 
federal government declined to list as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) on the grounds that existing RMPs covering sage grouse habitat on federal lands 
                                                 
225 Id. 
226 The decision to eliminate the use of MLPs was based on a report issued by the Department of Interior last fall 
which outlined regulatory “burdens” to energy development (which included the MLPs). The report was prepared in 
order to comply with President Trump’s President Trump’s Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence 
and Economic Growth. See DOI, FINAL REPORT: REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ACTIONS THAT POTENTIALLY 
BURDEN DOMESTIC ENERGY (Oct. 24, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/G6JR-K6C7. 
227 BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-034 (2018), supra note 224, at § 4. 
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provided adequate protections for the birds. Environmental groups filed suit, alleging, among 
other things, that the application of the new BLM leasing policy in this context was unlawful. The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho issued a preliminary injunction on September 21, 2018 
prohibiting BLM from applying the new policy to oil and gas leases in sage grouse habitat.228  
 
4. Curtailing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Analyses in Environmental Reviews 
As noted above, DOI terminated the PEIS for the federal coal leasing program, and BLM 
adopted guidance seeking to reduce the number of EISs and EAs prepared for fossil fuel leasing 
decisions – both actions are indicative of the current administration’s desire to avoid 
environmental reviews of fossil fuel-related proposals  
DOI and its constituent agencies have also attempted to curtail their analysis of 
greenhouse gas emissions in NEPA reviews for fossil fuel-related proposals to avoid issuing 
findings that these decisions have a significant impact on greenhouse gases. Granted, even if the 
agencies concluded that leasing decisions did have a significant impact on greenhouse gases, 
NEPA does not require the agencies to mitigate that impact or select a more environmentally 
friendly action. But a finding of significant impact could have political ramifications and could 
also affect future determinations about how and whether to proceed with federal fossil fuel 
leasing in light of environmental and social concerns. 
There are several ways in which DOI agencies have limited the greenhouse gas analysis 
in NEPA documents. One approach has been to simply ignore indirect emissions from the 
processing, transportation, and consumption of fuels produced on federal lands (often referred 
to as “downstream emissions”). This was common practice across many agencies even during 
the Obama administration, but there are now numerous court decisions challenging that 
practice.229  
                                                 
228 Western Watersheds Project v. Zinke, No. 1:18-cv-00187 (D. Idaho Sept. 21, 2018). 
229 For a review of court decisions through 2016, see Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARVARD ENVTL. L.J. 109 (2017). See also WildEarth 
Guardians v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222outerc (10th Cir. 2017); Montana Environmental 
Information Center v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining, 274 F.Supp.3d 1074, 1097-99 (D. Mt. Aug. 14, 2017); Western 
Organization of Resource Councils v. BLM, No. CV 16-21-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018); San 
Juan Citizens All. v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 16-CV-376-MCA-JHR, 2018 WL 2994406 (D.N.M. June 
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In the wake of those decisions, it is legally risky for agencies to ignore downstream 
emissions. However, there are other arguments for “disregarding” downstream emissions. In 
particular, the agencies that conduct reviews for fossil fuel leasing (primarily BLM and BOEM) 
have argued in these reviews that fossil fuels would be produced and consumed at similar rates 
regardless of whether the federal government authorizes production of fuels on public lands, and 
thus the net emissions impact of a federal leasing decision is very small or nonexistent.  Courts 
have rejected unsubstantiated assumptions that federal coal leasing has no effect on emissions due 
to “perfect substitution” of other coal resources (because economic data suggests that an increase 
in federal production would have some impact on coal prices and consumption),230 but agencies 
are now using economic models to support their conclusions that fossil fuel leasing has minor net 
emissions impacts.231 Opponents of fossil fuel development have raised serious concerns about 
the assumptions underpinning these models and the lack of transparency in the agency analysis, 
particularly the assumptions about energy substitutes.232 They have also raised questions about 
whether it makes sense to look at “net emissions” in this fashion, given the inherent uncertainties 
in the analysis, as opposed to simply calculating the total downstream emissions generated by 
the processing, transportation, and use of fossil fuels produced from federal lands and waters. 
Agencies have also avoided issuing significance determinations for greenhouse gas 
emissions from fossil fuel leases by arguing that: (i) there is no defined threshold for gauging the 
significance of those emissions, and (ii) the emissions are relatively small in proportion to overall 
global, national, state, or sectoral emissions. There are in fact tools that agencies could use to 
assess the significance of emissions – these include the significance criteria outlined in the NEPA 
regulations;233 EPA’s threshold which it uses to identify major emitters for the purposes of 
                                                 
14, 2018); Wilderness Workshop v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 1:16-cv-01822-WYD (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 
2018). 
230 WildEarth Guardians v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2017); High Country 
Conservation Advocates v. United States Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1197 (D. Colo. 2014). 
231 See, e.g., E. WOLVOVSKY & W. ANDERSON, OCS OIL AND NATURAL GAS: POTENTIAL LIFECYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, BOEM OCS Report 2016-065 (2016). 
232 Consider the example of natural gas production: if an agency assumes that the produced natural gas would offset 
the use of renewables as well as other fossil fuels, then the net emissions will be much higher than if the agency only 
looks at offsetting effects on fossil fuels.  
233 The NEPA regulations instruct agencies to consider both the context and intensity of the emissions. Intensity could 
be assessed using the other tools noted in this paragraph. Contextual factors which are relevant to any proposal 
which would increase the production of fossil fuels include: (i) the fact that climate change is such a massive 
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greenhouse gas emission reporting (25,000 tons CO2e per year);234 the metrics for calculating the 
social cost of carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide (which have been upheld by courts for use in 
regulatory and environmental analyses, though the Trump administration has been moving 
away from use of these metrics);235 and EPA’s GHG Equivalencies Calculator (which could be 
used to compare emissions from the proposal with, e.g., emissions from household electricity use 
or vehicle miles driven).236 However, no courts have yet addressed the issue of whether agencies’ 
failure to issue significance determinations for greenhouse gas emissions constitutes a violation 
of NEPA. 
These issues are not unique to DOI reviews – DOE and FERC, which are responsible for 
conducting reviews of natural gas transportation infrastructure and export terminals, have 
adopted similar arguments in their reviews.237  
 
5. Rescinding the Coal, Oil, and Gas Valuation Rule 
In 2016, the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) within DOI issued a rule aimed 
at improving valuation of coal, oil, and gas produced from federal leases and coal produced from 
Indian leases. 238 The original rule sought to ensure that states and the federal government would 
receive the full value of royalties due for oil, gas, and coal extracted from public lands by 
amending a provision that allowed companies to avoid royalty payments in certain contexts.239 
                                                 
environmental problem; (ii) the broad scope of interests that will be adversely affected by this problem, and (iii) the 
compelling need to rapidly reduce dependency on fossil fuels to address this problem. 40 CFR § 1508.27. 
234 EPA, GHG Reporting Program Facts and Figures, https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/key-facts-and-figures 
235 See Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support Document: Technical 
Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (May 2013, 
Revised August 2016); Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Addendum to Technical 
Support Document on Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866: 
Application of the Methodology to Estimate the Social Cost of Methane and the Social Cost of Nitrous Oxide (Aug. 
2016). See also Zero Zone Inc. v. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding use of the metrics derived 
by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon); Montana Environmental Information Center v. U.S. 
Office of Surface Mining, 274 F.Supp.3d 1074 (D. Montana 2017) (requiring disclosure of GHG costs in NEPA review 
where benefits were also disclosed, and citing the federal Social Cost of Carbon as an available disclosure tool); High 
Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service, 52 F.Supp.3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014) (same). 
236 EPA, GHG Equivalencies Calculator, https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator. 
237 See infra section V. 
238 ONRR, Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 
43337 (July 1, 2016). 
239 Id. 
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ONRR estimated that the rule would increase royalty collections by between $71.9 million and 
$84.8 million annually.240 
ONRR quickly reversed course on the rule after President Trump took office. On February 
27, 2017, ONRR published a Federal Register notice stating that “justice require[d] it” to postpone 
the effective date of the valuation rule, citing the fact that lawsuits challenging the rule raised 
“serious questions concerning the validity or prudent of certain provisions.”241 ONRR then 
published a proposal to “repeal the [rule] in its entirety” on April 4, 2017,242 and a final rule to 
this effect on August 7, 2017.243 
California and New Mexico filed a lawsuit challenging the postponement as a violation 
of the APA. The reviewing judge agreed that it violated the APA but declined to vacate the notice 
in light of ONRR’s decision to repeal the rule (which had been finalized before the court issued 
its decision).244 California and New Mexico also filed a lawsuit challenging the repeal of the 
valuation rule. On March 29, 2019, a district court in the Northern District of California held that 
the repeal was arbitrary and capricious because DOI had failed to explain the inconsistencies 
between its prior findings in enacting the valuation rule and its decision to repeal the rule.245 In 
the wake of this decision, ONRR officials are reported to have signaled that they may propose a 
replacement rather than a full repeal of the valuation rule.246 
 
6. Removing Protections for Endangered Species 
 On July 19, 2018, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) published a proposal 
to amend their implementing regulations for the Endangered Species Act (ESA).247 The proposed 
                                                 
240 Id. at 43359. 
241 ONRR, Postponement of Effectiveness of the Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation 
Reform 2017 Valuation Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 11823 (Feb. 27, 2017). 
242 ONRR, Proposed Rule: Repeal of Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform 
Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 16323 (Apr. 4, 2017). 
243 Repeal of Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 
36834 (Aug. 7, 2017). 
244 Becerra v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
245 California et al v. DOI et al, No. C17-5948 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
246 Pamela King, Courts Derail Trump’s March to ‘Energy Dominance’, E&E NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019). 
247 FWS & NMFS, Proposed Rule; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Regulations for 
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 83 Fed. Reg. 35193 (July 25, 2018); FWS & NMFS, Proposed Rule; 
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amendments would modify key requirements pertaining to listing determinations, critical habitat 
designations, interagency consultations, and taking prohibitions, ultimately weakening 
protections for species and making it easier for public and private projects to proceed despite the 
potential for adverse impacts on threatened and endangered species (or species which would be 
listed as such prior to these amendments). For example, the proposed amendments would repeal 
language which required that agencies make listing determinations “without reference to the 
possible economic or other impacts of such determinations” (thus allowing agencies to consider 
economic impacts in listing decisions).248  The amendments would also limit agency discretion to 
rely on future impacts as a basis for listing decisions and to designate habitat outside of the 
species’ present range, thus making it harder to for agencies to account for climate change in 
listings and critical habitat designations.249 
 The Trump administration has not formally acknowledged any nexus between the 
proposed ESA amendments and the President’s energy agenda, but the amendments, if adopted, 
would make it easier to develop fossil fuels on both public and private lands by removing barriers 
associated with the protection of threatened and endangered species. Recognizing this, the fossil 
fuel industry has long lobbied for the weakening of ESA regulations.250  It should also be noted 
that other parties have also sought modifications to the ESA, and ESA requirements can impede 
not only fossil fuel infrastructure but also renewable energy facilities and other projects aimed at 





                                                 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of Regulations for Interagency Cooperation, 83 Fed. Reg. 
35178 (July 15, 2018); FWS & NMFS, Proposed Rule; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Revision of the 
Regulations for Prohibitions to Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 83 Fed. Reg. 35174 (July 25, 2018). 
248 83 Fed. Reg. at 35194. 
249 83 Fed. Reg. at 35195; 35197-98. See also Jessica Wentz, Proposed Amendments to Endangered Species Act Regulations 
Could Curtail Protections for Species Imperiled by Climate Change, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2018/09/19/proposed-amendments-to-endangered-species-act-
regulations-could-curtail-protections-for-species-imperiled-by-climate-change/. 
250 See Dan Spinelli, This Is Why Lawmakers Want to Gut the Endangered Species Act, MOTHER JONES (July 25, 2018); 
Rebecca Bowe, What’s Behind Attacks on the Endangered Species Act? Lots of Money, EARTHJUSTICE BLOG (July 18, 2017). 
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C. Expanding Land Available for Fossil Fuel Development 
1. Expanding Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing 
As noted above, Secretarial Order No. 3350 directed the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
management (BOEM) to develop a new five-year plan for oil and gas exploration in offshore 
waters and to reconsider a number of regulations governing those activities, pursuant to 
President Trump’s Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy. 
That order also purported to revoke two actions taken by the Obama administration to withdraw 
approximately 125 million acres of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) from leasing (including 
most of the Beaufort Sea and all of the Chukchi Sea in the Arctic).251 
On January 4, 2018, BOEM issued a proposed OCS Leasing Program for 2019-2024, which 
would make over ninety percent of the OCS available for future oil and gas exploration and 
development.252 In comparison, the 2017-2022 offshore leasing program (which would be 
superseded by this new program) puts ninety-four percent of the OCS off-limits to oil and gas 
development. The Draft Proposed Program (DPP) includes 47 potential lease sales in 25 of 26 
planning areas – which, according to DOI, is the largest number of lease sales ever proposed for 
the OCS 5-year lease schedule.253 DOI has not yet published a draft EIS or final rule for this 
program. 
In the meantime, the administration has continued to move forward with expanding 
offshore oil and gas production under the existing OCS program. As of September 2018, the 
administration had offered 81,324,267 acres of publicly owned waters to oil and gas companies.254 
However, the administration was recently blocked from moving forward with its plans to open 
up the Beaufort and Chukchi seas for oil and gas leasing. On March 29, 2019, a district court in 
the District of Alaska found that President Trump’s order to re-open the areas of the OCS for oil 
                                                 
251 See Exec. Order 13795 (2018), supra note 18, at §§ 4(c), 5. 
252 DOI Press Release: Secretary Zinke Announces Plan For Unleashing America's Offshore Oil and Gas Potential (Jan. 
4, 2018), https://perma.cc/8RZB-GC37; BOEM, DRAFT PROPOSED PROGRAM: 2019-2024 NATIONAL OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING (Jan. 2018), available at https://perma.cc/Q683-6S5V; BOEM, Notice of Availability of the 
2019-2024 Draft Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program and Notice of Intent To Prepare a 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 83 Fed. Reg. 829 (Jan. 8, 2018);  
253 Id. 
254 The Wilderness Society, Trump’s Land Grab – In 7 Maps (2018), 
https://wilderness.maps.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html. 
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and gas leasing that had been withdrawn by President Obama violated the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) because the act only authorizes Presidents to withdraw areas from the 
national oil and gas leasing program (and thus the authority to add areas remains with 
Congress).255 The following month, DOI Secretary David Bernhardt announced that the 
department had indefinitely paused its  plans to expand offshore oil and gas production in view 
of the ruling.256  
 
2. Removing Protections for National Monuments 
The Trump administration has also sought to increase the land available for fossil fuel 
development by removing protections that would bar such development, such as those provided 
for national monuments designated under the Antiquities Act of 1906. 
On April 26, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13792, Review of 
Designations Under the Antiquities Act, which established a policy recognizing that national 
monuments “have a substantial impact on the management of Federal lands and the use and 
enjoyment of neighboring lands” and that such designations may “create barriers to achieving 
energy independence, restrict public access to and use of Federal lands, burden State, tribal, and 
local governments, and otherwise curtail economic growth.”257 The order directed DOI to conduct 
a review of all National Monuments designated or expanded since 1996 where the designation or 
expansion covers more than 100,000 acres or where DOI believes the designation or expansion 
was made without adequate public outreach, to determine whether each designation or 
expansion confirms with this policy.258 
On May 11, 2017, DOI announced plans to conduct the review called for in the Executive 
Order and to formulate recommendations for Presidential actions, legislative proposals, or other 
appropriate actions to carry out that policy.259 The notice identified twenty-seven National 
                                                 
255 League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F.Supp.3d (D. Alaska 2019). 
256 Timothy Puko, Trump’s Offshore Oil-Drilling Plan Sidelined Indefinitely, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 25, 2019). 
257 Exec. Order. No. 13792 of April 26, 2017, Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 20429 
(May 1, 2017). 
258 Id. at § 2. 
259 DOI, Review of Certain National Monuments Established Since 1996; Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment, 
82 Fed. Reg. 22016 (May 11, 2017). 
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Monuments under review and invites comments to inform the review.260 On August 24, 2017, 
DOI released a summary of findings from its public outreach during this review process, in which 
it recognized that the “[c]omments received were overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining 
existing monuments.”261  On December 5, 2017, DOI released a final report in which it 
recommended maintaining all national monuments as federal lands, adding three new national 
monuments, but also modifying the boundaries and management of four monuments and 
expanding access for hunting and fishing.262  
Acting on these recommendations, President Trump issued proclamations reducing the 
size of two national monuments in Utah: the Bears Ears National Monument was reduced from 
1.35 million acres to just over 200,000 acres,263 and the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument was reduced from 1.8 million acres to approximately 860,000 acres.264 These were the 
most significant reductions of National Monuments by any president.265 Emails obtained from a 
FOIA request showed that the availability of oil and coal on these lands was a key part of the 
decision to reduce the size of the monuments.266 
Multiple tribes and conservation organizations sued over the reduction of the 
monuments, arguing that the Antiquities Act only authorizes a President to designate 
monuments – it does not grant authority to revoke or modify a monument. The lawsuits have 
been consolidated into two cases – one for Grand Staircase and one for Bears Ears – but briefing 
schedules have not yet been set.267 In the meantime, DOI has already opened the land removed 
                                                 
260 Id. 
261 DOI Press Release: Secretary Zinke Sends Monument Report to the White House (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7JP4-BM5B. 
262 DOI Memorandum: Final Report Summarizing Findings of the Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act 
(Dec. 5, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/HLE3-SCGK. 
263 Presidential Proclamation 9681 of December 4, 2017: Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 
58081 (Dec. 4, 2017). 
264 Presidential Proclamation 9682 of December 4, 2017: Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 58089 (Dec. 8. 2017). 
265 Juliet Eilperin, Trump to Cut Bears National Monument by 85 Percent, Grand Staircase-Escalante by Half, Documents 
Show, Washington Post (Nov. 30, 2017). 
266  Eric Lipton & Lisa Friedman, Oil Was Central in Decision to Shrink Bears Ears Monument, Emails Show, N.Y. Times 
(Mar. 2, 2018); Brian Maffly, Oil and Coal Drove Trump’s Call to Shrink Bears Ears and Grand Staircase, According to 
Insider Emails Released by Court Order, The Salt Lake Tribune (Mar. 3, 2018). 
267 Wilderness Society et al v. Trump et al, Docket No. 1:17-cv-02587 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017) (Grand Staircase Escalante 
National Monument); Hopi Tribe et al. v. Trump et al, Docket No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. Dec 04, 2017) (Bears Ears 
National Monument). 
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from the monuments for mining and fossil fuel development,268 and as of June 2018, more than 
51,000 acres had been leased to oil companies269 and at least 20 mining claims totaling 460 acres 
had been had staked on those lands.270  
 
3. Expanding Fossil Fuel Leasing on Other Lands 
DOI and its constituent agencies have also taken a number of steps to expand fossil fuel 
leasing on other federal lands. As of September 2018, the administration had offered 13,667,241 
acres of publicly owned land to oil and gas companies (more than the size of Maryland and New 
Jersey combined).271 BLM also recently opened 9 million acres of sage grouse habitat to drilling 
and mining through revisions to the RMPs covering that habitat.272 This is a particularly 
controversial action because, as noted above, as the federal government relied upon protections 
in the existing RMPs as the basis for determining that the sage grouse need not be listed under 
the ESAAs noted above, a district court in Idaho recently issued a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting BLM from applying its policy on streamlining oil and gas permitting in the sage 
grouse habitat. The administration is also moving forward with plans for oil and gas leasing in 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) after Congress passed legislation in late 2017 which 
opened the ANWR for drilling, and recently published a proposal to open anywhere from 66 to 




                                                 
268 J. Weston Phippen, Bears Ears Officially Opens to Oil and Gas Development, Outside (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/M75F-GASD. 
269 Miranda Green, Drillers Snag Leases Near Bears Ears Monument, The Hill (Mar. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/23E8-
ULML. 
270 Chris D’Angelo, 20 Mining Claims Have Been Staked On Land Trump Cut From Monument Protection, Huffington Post 
(June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/C8S7-MPSM. 
271 The Wilderness Society, Trump’s Land Grab – In 7 Maps (2018), supra note 254. 
272 The revised RMPs are available at: DOI, Notice of Intent to Amend the Greater Sage-Grouse Resource Management Plan 
Revisions and Amendment(s), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-
office/eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage&currentPageId=134121 (last visited 
May 16, 2019). 
273 DOI, Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing Proposed RMP and EIS, https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-
office/eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=renderDefaultPlanOrProjectSite&projectId=102555&dctmId=0
b0003e8810d09e5 (last visited May 16, 2019.  See also Steve Eder & Henry Fountain, The Race for Alaskan Oil: 6 Key 
Takeaways, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018). 
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V. Department of Energy 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has also played a role in President Trump’s agenda for 
promoting fossil fuels and rolling back climate-related protections. There are two key areas in 
which DOE has assisted with these efforts: (i) by rolling back certain energy efficiency standards, 
and (ii) by participating in Trump’s attempt to revive the coal industry. 
 
A. Energy Efficiency Standards 
When President Trump first took office, he issued a Presidential Memorandum, 
“Regulatory Freeze Pending review,” which directed all agencies to postpone the publication of 
new and pending regulations to give the administration time to review those regulations. Acting 
pursuant to this memorandum, DOE postponed the publication of several energy efficiency 
standards that it had recently finalized but not yet published in the Federal Register, including 
standards for portable air conditions, uninterruptible power supplies, walk-in-cooler and freezer 
systems, commercial packaged boilers, air compressors, and pool pumps.274 DOE also postponed 
the effective date of five efficiency-related rules that had been published in the Federal Register 
until March 21, 2017, including test procedures for walk-in coolers and freezers, test procedures 
for central air conditioners and heaters, test procedures for compressors, energy conservation 
standards for ceiling fans, and energy efficient construction standards for federal buildings.275 On 
                                                 
274 DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Portable Air Conditioners; Final Rule, 
RIN 1904-AD02 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/2HBF-TKN6; DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy 
Conservation Standards for Walk-in Cooler and Freezer Refrigeration System; Final Rule, RIN 1904-AD59 (Dec. 
2016), https://perma.cc/U2YD-ZUVW; DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for 
Commercial Packaged Boilers; Final Rule, RIN 1904-AD01 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/C57Y-VG5B; DOE, Energy 
Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Dedicated-Purpose Pool Pumps; Final Rule, RIN 1904-
AD52 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/3WWP-UR36; DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation 
Standards for Uninterruptible Power Supplies; Final Rule, RIN 1904-AD69 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/X4RM-3BE9; 
DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Air 
Compressors; Final rule, RIN 1904-AC83 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/LC4J-837Z. 
275 DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Test Procedure for Walk-in Coolers and Walk-in Freezers; Final Rule; Delay 
of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8805 (Jan. 31, 2017);  DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation 
Standards for Ceiling Fans; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8806 (Jan. 31, 2017);  DOE, Energy 
Conservation Program: Test Procedures for Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps; Final Rule; Delay of Effective 
Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 8985 (Feb. 2, 2017); DOE, Energy Conservation Program: Test Procedures for Compressors; Final 
Rule; Delay of Effective Date; 82 Fed. Reg. 8985 (Feb. 2, 2017); DOE, Energy Efficiency Standards for the Design and 
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March 21, 2017, DOE further postponed the effective date for those five rules to new dates in June, 
July and September 2017.276  
On March 31, 2017, a coalition of states filed a petition challenging the administration’s 
decision to delay the energy efficiency standards for ceiling fans.277 The plaintiffs included 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New York State, New York City, Oregon, 
Vermont, and Washington, and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Two 
months later, DOE published notice that the ceiling fans rule would be finalized and would go 
into effect on September 30, 2017, thus ending the dispute over the ceiling fans.278 DOE also issued 
a notice that it would finalize standards and set compliance dates for residential central air 
conditioners and heat pumps.279 
On June 13, 2017, the same coalition of states and several NGOs filed suit over DOE’s 
failure to finalize five other energy efficiency standards – specifically those for air compressors, 
walk-in coolers and freezers, uninterruptable power supplies, portable air conditioners, and 
commercial packaged boilers.280  On February 15, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California held that DOE’s failure to publish the efficiency standards violated its duties 
under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.281 The court therefore granted the plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment and ordered DOE to publish the standards. 
The Natural Resources Defense Council filed a separate lawsuit challenging DOE’s 
temporary suspension of efficiency test procedures for air conditioners and heat pumps. Plaintiffs 
                                                 
Construction of New Federal Low-Rise Residential Buildings' Baseline Standards Update; Final Rule; Delay of 
Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 9343 (Feb. 6, 2017). 
276 DOE, Test Procedure for Walk-in Coolers and Walk-in Freezers; Final Rule; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 
Fed. Reg. 14426 (Mar. 21, 2017); DOE, Test Procedures for Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps; Final Rule; 
Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14425 (Mar. 21, 2017); DOE, Test Procedures for Compressors; Final 
Rule; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14426 (Mar. 21, 2017); DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for 
Ceiling Fans; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg.14427 (Mar. 21, 2017);  DOE, Energy Efficiency 
Standards for the Design and Construction of New Federal Low-Rise Residential Buildings' Baseline Standards 
Update; Final Rule; Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 14427 (Mar. 21, 2017). 
277 New York et al. v. Perry, No. 17-918 (2d Cir. 2017) 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2017_03_31_petition_and_rules_final.pdf 
278 DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for Ceiling Fans; Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 23723 (May 24, 2017). 
279 DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps; Final Rule; 82 
Fed. Reg. 24211 (May 26, 2017). 
280 NRDC v. Perry, No. 3:17-cv-03404 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
281 NRDC v. Perry, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
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were successful with this challenge as well. On February 22, 2019, a district court in the Southern 
District of New York held that the suspension violated the APA because it had been issued 
without adherence to notice and comment procedures.282 
DOE also withdrew a rule to establish energy conservation standards for manufactured 
housing (which was called for by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007).283 The 
proposed rule had been published in the Federal Register in June 2016,284 and DOE submitted the 
final rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review and publication 
on November 1, 2016.  But the final rule was not finalized as of January 21, 2017 (the date of the 
regulatory freeze) and was therefore withdrawn in its entirety. The withdrawn rule would have 
established requirements related to duct leakage; heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC); 
service hot water systems; mechanical ventilation fan efficacy; and heating and cooling 
equipment sizing, as well as requirements related to climate zones and the building thermal 
envelope of manufactured homes. According to the DOE, the new energy efficiency standards 
would have reduced total CO2 emissions by 60.5 and 97.6 million metric tons, from single-section 
and multi-section homes, respectively, purchased between 2017-2046. The DOE also calculated 
the net economic impact of the standards and concluded that they would generate $5.29-$8.93 
billion in net consumer benefits and $11.52-$31.95 billion in net nationwide benefits over a 30-
year period. The nationwide benefits are much larger because they include the environmental 
impacts of the anticipated CO2 and NOx reductions. 
On February 11, 2019, DOE issued a proposal to repeal another energy efficiency rule – 
specifically, regulations that expanded the number of light bulbs subject to energy efficiency 
standards which go into effect next year.285 The regulations that DOE has proposed to repeal 
redefined the term “general service lamps” to include certain light bulbs that were previously 
considered to be so specialized that they should not be subject to standard rules, primarily bulbs 
                                                 
282 NRDC v. DOE, No. 1:17-cv-06989 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
283 DOE, Energy Efficiency Standards for Manufactured Housing, RIN 1904-AC11 (2016). 
284 DOE, Energy Conservation Standards for Manufactured Housing; Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 39756 (June 17, 
2016). 
285 DOE, Proposed Rule: Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service Lamps, 
84 Fed. Reg. 3120 (Feb. 11, 2019). 
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known as incandescent reflector lamps. Commentators have noted that this rollback could cost 
U.S. consumers billions of dollars in lost energy savings.286 
 
B. Support for Coal Power Generation Facilities  
In the summer of 2017, DOE conducted a grid vulnerability study to assess whether 
changing energy market conditions were affecting grid reliability and resilience. DOE’s final 
report on the topic contained many positive findings about “variable renewable energy” (VRE) 
resources (primarily wind and solar) – specifically, that they actually made the electricity grid 
more flexible and reliable, made bulk power less expensive, and performed a “price stabilizing 
role.”287 But DOE also found that the dispatch of VRE “has negatively impacted the economics of 
baseload plants” – specifically, coal and nuclear plants – and expressed concerns that this could 
adversely affect grid reliability (despite the other findings in the report indicating that greater 
penetration of VRE may improve reliability).288 
Based on that concern, DOE proposed a Resiliency Pricing Rule on September 28, 2017, 
which would have subsidized nuclear- and coal- fired generation in three wholesale power 
markets where other sources of generation are more economically competitive.289 Specifically, the 
proposal purported to direct FERC to use its authority under the Federal Power Act to require 
wholesale electricity market operators to provide a special discounted rate for generators that 
demonstrate “reliability and resiliency attributes” such as a 90-day fuel supply and the ability to 
provide ancillary reliably services (essentially, attributes of baseload coal and nuclear facilities).290 
FERC issued an order on January 8, 2018 rejecting the rule, finding that it did not satisfy the 
requirements of the Federal Power Act – in particular, the requirement to make a showing that 
                                                 
286 Alliance to Save Energy, DOE Proposal to Roll Back Lightbulb Efficiency Would Hurt Consumers, Innovation (Feb. 6, 
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existing rates are “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.”291 In that same 
order, FERC initiated its own proceeding to evaluate bulk power system resilience on a more 
holistic basis, looking not only at the impacts of fuel supply but also market rules and 
coordination, transmission planning, and reliability standards.292 This proceeding is still ongoing. 
Despite this setback, the administration moved forward with its efforts to provide 
preferential treatment to coal and nuclear facilities. On June 1, 2018, the White House announced 
that President Trump had asked DOE to take immediate steps to prevent retirement of coal and 
nuclear power generation facilities.293 On that same day, a draft memo dated May 29, 2018, was 
leaked which outlined actions for DOE to take on this matter.294 According to that memo, DOE 
planned to exercise its emergency authority under the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the 
Federal Power Act to direct grid operators to purchase power from a designated list of nuclear 
and coal power plants. This system would remain in place for two years while the federal 
government conducts research on vulnerabilities in U.S. energy delivery systems, including those 
associated with the transition from fossil fuels to renewables. The memo confirmed earlier reports 
that DOE was looking to use its emergency authority to support coal and nuclear operations.295 
However, in June 2019, DOE Secretary Rick Perry announced that DOE does not have the 
“regulatory or statutory ability” to create economic incentives for coal or nuclear plants and that 
the administration would need to rely on FERC to move forward with its plans.296  
 
C. Expediting and Curtailing Reviews for Natural Gas Infrastructure Approvals 
DOE and FERC have also undertaken efforts to streamline and expediate approvals of 
natural gas transportation infrastructure, including pipelines and liquified natural gas (LNG) 
terminals. On September 1, 2017, DOE proposed a rule to provide for automated approval of 
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applications for small-scale exports of natural gas (of a volume up to and including 0.14 billion 
cubic feet (Bcf) per day) to countries with which the U.S. has not entered into a free trade 
agreement and with which trade is not prohibited by U.S. law or policy.297 DOE published a final 
rule for that proposal on July 25, 2018.298 
Some have argued that expanding natural gas infrastructure may actually reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions because natural gas will replace coal as an energy source. However, 
expanding this infrastructure also locks in the use of natural gas as opposed to cleaner energy 
sources, and recent studies have found that natural gas infrastructure emits significantly more 
methane than previously estimated (which raises questions about the actual magnitude of the 
emission reduction benefits associated with switching from coal to natural gas).299 DOE and FERC 
have also received criticism for failing to analyze the effect of expanding natural gas 
transportation infrastructure on fossil fuel consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and climate 
change. FERC, in particular, has resisted public requests to fully evaluate upstream and 
downstream emissions generated as a result of its pipeline approvals. In 2017, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that an analysis of downstream emissions was required for a pipeline 
project where FERC knew that the natural gas would be transported to and consumed at domestic 
power plants.300 However, since that decision, FERC has declined to analyze downstream 
emissions for other natural gas transportation projects on the basis that it “does not have 
meaningful information about future power plants, storage facilities, or distribution networks” 
that it can use to forecast those emissions.301 
 
VI. State Department 
The State Department has been responsible for implementing Trump’s agenda with 
respect to foreign policy on climate change. The Department has taken measures to reduce U.S. 
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participation in international discussions occurring under the UNFCCC – for example, by 
reducing the number of staff in its Office of Global Change and by eliminating the special envoy 
for climate change.302 Its  most significant role of course has been in carrying out President 
Trump’s plans to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. 
 
A. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 
President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on June 
1, 2017.303 In that announcement, he stated that the U.S. would “cease all implementation of the 
Paris Agreement” including the implementation of our Nationally Determined Contribution 
(NDC) and contributions to the Green Climate Fund.304 On August 4, 2017, the State Department 
submitted a formal communication to the UNFCCC Secretariat expressing its intent to withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement “as soon as it is eligible to do so.”305 
Notably, the Paris Agreement does not allow parties to submit their notice of withdrawal 
until three years after its entry into force (November 4, 2016). Once a party does submit such 
notice, there is a one-year period before the withdrawal becomes effective. Thus, the U.S. 
withdrawal cannot become effective until November 4, 2020 (the day after the next presidential 
election). The agreement does not explicitly address the procedures for rejoining the agreement 
after exiting, but a future President could re-join the agreement, as there is no bar on re-entry. 
President Trump and the State Department have not made any formal effort to withdraw 
from the UNFCCC parent agreement. That agreement was ratified by the Senate in 1992 and the 
U.S. is still bound to adhere to the commitments contained therein. There is an unsettled legal 
debate as to whether a President can unilaterally withdraw from a treaty that was ratified by the 
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Senate, but many scholars believe that the consent of the Senate is legally required in this 
context.306 
B. Approval of Transboundary Pipelines 
The State Department has the authority to issue Presidential Permits for transboundary 
oil pipelines and other infrastructure intended to export or import oil.307 The State Department 
must determine that such infrastructure is in the public interest before issuing a permit, taking 
into account factors such as safety, environment, and economic impacts. During the Obama 
Administration, the State Department reviewed and ultimately denied the application for the 
Keystone XL pipeline based on a determination that it would not serve the public interest.308 The 
“critical factor” cited in this decision was the department’s determination that “moving forward 
with this project would significantly undermine our ability to continue leading the world in 
combatting climate change.”309   
President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum on January 24, 2017, in which he 
invited the pipeline developer, TransCanada, to re-submit its application and directed the 
Secretary of State to “take all actions necessary and appropriate” to expedite the approval of this 
application.310 The State Department approved the Keystone XL pipeline application on March 
23, 2017.311 Environmental and tribal groups challenged the approval in court, alleging violations 
of the APA, NEPA, Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Bald and Golden 
Eagle Protection Act. On November 8, 2018, the Montana District Court issued a decision in favor 
of petitioners and enjoined TransCanada from engaging in any activity in furtherance of the 
construction and operation of the pipeline.312 The court held that the State Department had 
violated the APA by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for reversing course on the pipeline 
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application, and that the State Department had also erred in its NEPA analysis by failing to 




Upon coming into office, the Trump administration promised to roll back many of the 
regulatory measures the Obama administration had put in place to protect the climate and to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  As detailed above, however, most of the deregulatory actions 
undertaken by the Trump administration with respect to climate change and fossil fuels are 
incomplete or stalled in the courts. The administration has been able to quickly repeal and revise 
policy statements and guidance documents, but modifying regulations has proven to be a much 
lengthier and more challenging process. To date, only four of the notice-and-comment 
rulemakings identified in this paper have resulted in final agency action (amendments to the 
Methane Waste Prevention Rule, amendments to the Coal Ash Rule, minor amendments to the 
Methane NSPS for Oil and Gas Sources, and repeal of the Coal, Oil, and Gas Valuation Rule). All 
of the other rulemakings are either still in the preliminary stages of review or at the proposed rule 
stage. It could be months or years before the administration promulgates a final action in those 
proceedings, and if and when that occurs, the actions will most likely be challenged in court.  
There are also the prospects that courts may vacate final rules issued by the Trump 
administration to repeal and revise climate change protections or that the next President will 
reverse course and reinstate or even strengthen those protections. All of this regulatory back-and-
forth consumes a tremendous amount of administrative resources and creates significant 
uncertainty for regulated entities.  For all these reasons, Trump’s deregulatory efforts are not 
likely to achieve their results. 
Ultimately, this situation is untenable for both regulated entities and an American public 
that wants effective action to reduce the risk of global climate change. There is a compelling need 
for a coherent and cohesive federal policy on climate change that will protect the public’s welfare 
while also providing the clarity and predictability that regulated entities require. President 
Trump’s deregulatory agenda undermines both of these goals and should itself be replaced.  
